

3. NAGA HILLS.

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D.L. Banerjee

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1831-1890. The history of the Naga Hills since 1832, where Mackenzie leaves off, is the same in kind as that of year preceding. The process of penetrating into the Hills, the early stages of which are described in Mackenzie's book, has been a gradual one dictated originally, and mainly, by the necessity of Nagas, and generally agreed to at each step with great reluctance by the Supreme Government. Visits to troublesome village led ~~by~~ inevitable to the establishment of posts to control their doings. For our first permanent footing, Samoc gutting \*(Chimakudi) was chosen in 1866-67. This village commands the Diphu gorge, the natural path to the plains from the Angami country, and was a more suitable place from which Nawang could be protected against western Angami ~~raids~~ especially from the powerful villages of Mozema, Khonoma and Jotsoma, than the old outpost of Asalu to the south-west. Thence we proceeded in 1873 to move to Kohima in the centre of the Western Angami country in order to command both the Eastern Angami country and the Manipur frontier, and simultaneously to Wokha in order to dominate the Ilotha country to the east of the Dikhu and to protect it from raids from the north and east. The final decision to make the Naga Hills a British district was taken in 1881. The steps it thus taken had permitted the hope that, as Mackenzie (page 143) puts it, "on the whole the Angami Naga problem was at least in a fair way to final solution". The Angami in fact have now since given any serious trouble, but besides them and the other tribes enumerated in Chapters XIII of Mackenzie's work there were numerous others who were to offer problems to be solved.

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\* Nomenclature in the Naga Hills history present great difficulties just as it does in that of the Lushai Hills. Both place-names and names of tribes are exceedingly confusing throughout the older writings. To start with, of course, the general name of "Naga" is merely an Assamese appellation, meaning "naked" and like the stereotyped tribal names now in common use, is not what the people call themselves. This was fully recognised by the early British administrators. Thus Lieutenant

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G.F.F. Vincent. "Acting Junior Assistant Commissioner on Special Duty. Angamee Naga Hills", writing to his Principal Assistant Commissioner at Nowgong, Captain John Butler, on the 10th Sep. 1850, described how he was surprised to find "the people called by us 'Angami Nagas' were totally ignorant of the signification of the term and how he learnt that this was a term given by the Cacharees to all independent Nagas signifying in their language, "Unconquered". This is repeated in 1873 by that great authority Captain Butler, in the long extract regarding the Tribes quoted at page 84 of Mackenzie. Similarly the phrase "Hatiguria" was for long used as a synonym for "Ao" though it was certainly known as early as 1836 that the latter was more correct. Very frequently a tribe applies to itself merely the word meaning "man" in its own language-with the implication that members of that tribe are the only real men in the world. Thus the Lothas call themselves "Kyou". the name "Lotha" being apparently that applied to them by the Assamese.

By the exertions, however, of such ethnologists as Hutton and Mills who have been Deputy Commissioners of the District, the whole nomenclature has been put on a scientific footing. Monographs have been written by these and other authorities on the Naga Tribes in general and on the Angamis, Semas, Aos, Pengmas and Lothas.

The necessity of protecting the borders of Nowgong and Sibsagar against raiding Nagas which in the early days compelled us to penetrate into the hills little by little, ceases with the formation of the Naga Hills district. But the process of penetration went on, inexorably if irregularly. It was impossible to draw a line as the boundary of our area of control and to say that we should be blind and deaf to all that went on across that line. Transfrontier Nagas raid our administered villages, the latter are involved in dispute with the former, head hunting and massacres go on just across the border and under the very noses of our officers. In such conditions local officers inevitably, and with reason, clamour for forward policy. The Chief Commissioner

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some times supports them, sometimes he does not. The Government of India is nearly always reluctant.

in particular, thus carrying out the wish expressed by Mr. Chief Commissioner Elliot in ~~his~~ his memorandum of March 1881 (see page 4) below), and can be studied by anyone who wishes to acquaint himself with the ethnographical history of these interesting people.

Mr. J. P. Mills, C.I.E., I.C.S., who was Governor's Secretary throughout my time in Assam, and who had, previous to that, sixteen years experience of the Nagas, as Subdivisional Officer, Mokokchung and as Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills District writes as follows on this subject in a note by him, dated the 5th September 1941.

"On modern maps the names of villages shown are those used by the inhabitants themselves, a commonly used synonym being sometimes added in brackets. Sometimes the name in the old record is obviously merely a corruption of the correct name. Frequently however, there is no apparent connection between two at all. The reason for this is that at each advance in the Naga country officers tended to adopt the names of villages used by the interpreters hailing from the area on which the advance was based. For instance when we first entered the Ao country from the plains, Merangkong was known as Naogaon and Mubongchokut as Molodubia, and soon, Naogaon and Molodubia being the Assamese names for these villages, once established in the Ao country, officers began to ask the names of villages yet further in the interior and were naturally told the Ao names. Thus the big Chang village of Tuensang was for years known by its Ao name of Mozungjami - the village of wicked man for the Change were the hereditary enemies of the Aos. Further complication was caused by the system of transliteration used by the American Baptist Missionaries, who were often the first people to attempt to record Ao names in writing. They do not use the British system but write "j" where we should use "ch" and often omit "y". Thus "Chami" becomes "Jami" and "Yongyimsen" becomes "Yongimsen".

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The same process went on at the southern end of the district. Western Angami names were soon brought into use, though often misspelt, and for long Western Angami names were used for Eastern Angami and Kacha Naga Villages. For example, the Eastern Angami village of Chizami was wrongly called Khezabama, and even now Henima would hardly be recognised by its correct name of Tenning. When we began to acquire more detailed knowledge of the Eastern Angami country we began to learn their own names for their own villages. But there again, the same ~~error~~ <sup>error</sup> was repeated and Eastern Angami names were used for the less known Sangtam and Bengma villages beyond them. Even today "Melioni" and "Primi" are probably in more general use than the correct names of "Meluri" and "Akhegwo".

The method I have adopted, as in the case of Lushai names, is when a name first occurs, to put the correct spelling in square brackets after that used in the current records. But the frontier moves forward. Whatever difficulties were felt by Governments, the truth of the dictum of the Secretary of States of 1878. Lord Granb-ook, "the continuance in the immediate proximity of settled districts of a system of internecine warfare conducted principally against women and children cannot be tolerated" was vindicated time after time.

While, therefore, in 1882 our writ ran only in an area covering Kohima and Wokha and their immediate neighbourhood, we have in the intervening 60 years become responsible for an administered area covering country far to the east and south of the boundaries of that date, and beyond that again of an area of "Control".

After the occupation of Kohima and Wokha in 1878 the general policy appears to have been one of consolidating our rule around those two centres. Mr. C.A. Elliott, Chief Commissioner of Assam between 1881 and 1885, recorded on the 31st March 1881, a memorandum on the administration of the district after he had made a tour of the Naga Hills in the cold weather of 1880-31. A brief reference is made to it at page 142 of Mackenzie. As regards forced labour, which had been levied in a very unequal way,

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causing extreme dissatisfaction, he said things must be put right at once and laid down certain rules to that end. It is clear that transport arrangements at that time were very badly organised, if organised at all, the position being made difficult because the station of Kohima was in course of construction, His view as to disarmament of the district are, in the light of present condition *guns had been taken from the Nagas and that not* interesting. He states that all *was* even allowed to carry a spear. He regarded it as "essential that the habit of carrying on arms should be discouraged which has a martial tendency or lead the people to believe that they can successfully resist our arms". He was also very strong on the point that all village defences should be removed, and expressed the desire that the practice of fortifying villages sites should altogether be put a stop to, his idea being that as soon as the village ceased to be defensible it would be safe to relax the rules against bearing arms. His wishes however, were never fully carried out. Though village defences have in fact gradually fallen into disrepair, large numbers of guns did remain in Angami hands, and it is still normal for a Naga to carry a spear for use both as a "khud-stick" and to kill any game which may cross his path. He foresaw the great need of expanding the practice of terracing as an alternative to jhuming, and he was very insistent that his officers should try and spread this practice. (Over 30 years were to elapse before those orders were carried out. Dr. Hutton began to introduce terraces into the Sema country about 1915). He also advocated the extension of the cultivation of potatoes. Finally, he declared that all officers should do their utmost to enquire into and record the habits and customs of the people and said that he would be glad to publish works on these subjects free of cost.

\* Assam Secretariat Files No. 137-J. of 1881 and No. 104-J of 1882

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A further reference to policy is to be found in a letter dated the 25th January 1883 No.122 to the Deputy Commissioner, in which Mr. Elliott referred to his scheme for the allocation of out-posts in the district by which to bring home to the people the assurance that they are permanently under the domain of the British Power. This letter was written with reference to a report from Mr. R. B. McCabe, I.C.S., the then Deputy Commissioner, who had earlier in the month established a post without any opposition at the Sema village of Lozema (Lazami). The villagers had failed to pay their revenue in full two years and Mr. McCabe decided it was necessary to punish them. He took an ample force, met with no opposition and constructed a stockade where he left a garrison of 55 police under a British Officer. Incidentally, in his report he makes mention of the bitter mutual hatred between the pushing intruding Semas and the angamis, an antagonism which persists to this day.

A similar expedition on a smaller scale, but attended unfortunately with considerable loss of life, was undertaken by Mr. McCabe in June 1883 against the Sema village of Patami across the Diyung in reprisal for that village's raid on the Lhotha village of Tsingaki, or Chingki, as McCabe spells it. He took a force of 72 officers and men of the 44th Sylhet Light Infantry under Lieutenant Boileau and 42 officers and men of the Frontier Police under Mr. Livesay, Assistant Superintendent. The Deputy Commissioner reporting on the 28th June 1883, was fully satisfied with the results, but the operations certainly entailed severe loss both of life and property. The Nagas were estimated to have lost between 50 and 50 men, their houses and that were destroyed, and their cattle carried off. This incident seems to be closely connected with the steady pressure of the Semas towards the west, the pursuit of which received a check when we occupied Wokha.

McCabe raised the question of policy in a letter No.205 which he addressed to the Chief Commissioner on the 10th June 1884. He took the view that there were two possible policies, - (1) non-interference with the trans-Frontier people; (2) annexation

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(2) annexation. Of the two he preferred annexation carried out in a gradual way. He also explained that his own policy had been ~~xxx~~ based on four general principals, (a) to insist on strict ~~obdience~~ <sup>obedience</sup> within his ~~his~~ jurisdiction (b) to punish villages within his ~~xxx~~ jurisdiction for all raids committed against trans-Frontier villages; (c) to punish trans-Frontier village for raids against cis-Frontier villages; (d) as far as possible to mediate in disputes between villages adjacent to the Frontier.

It is interesting to observe that in paragraph 4 of his letter he uses the "somewhat singular name" as an Assam letter of November 1888 was ~~letter~~ to describe it, of "military promenade" to describe expeditions made by the Deputy Commissioner with an

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- \* Assam Secretariat, Foreign, B, February 1883, Nos. 12-13.
  - + Assam Secretariat, Foreign, B, December 1883, Nos. 4-11.
  - \* Assam Secretariat, Judicial Department, File No. 149-J of 1884.

armed escort among the Frontier tribes. This was later to become a common place term of the Naga Hills frontier, but was used possibly for the first time on this occasion in official correspondence.

The Chief Commissioner, Sir Charles Elliott and it looks as if the problems raised in this letter from the Deputy Commissioner had long been in his mind-addressed the Government of India on 22nd August 1884 in his letter No. 1263. he referred to the increase of outrages of recent years; to the decrease of influence of ~~British~~ British Officers and to what he considered had been the failure of the policy that had been carried on for the last 20 or 30 years. These circumstances had led him to review again the policy which had been associated during the year 1840-44 with the name of Captain Brodie, who was then in charge of the Sibsagar district, and which was described briefly in pages 93 of Mackenzie's work. The main feature of this policy were comprehensive excursions throughout the Naga villages accompanied by an armed force during the course of which Captain Brodie took engagements from the Chiefs to abandon their feuds and refer all differences to the British Power. ~~Six~~ Sir Charles Elliott proposed to revert to some extent to that policy and he outlined a scheme by which a force of 150 Naga Hills Frontier Police should start from Wokha in the Naga hills under Mr. McCabe; 50 Frontier Police should join in from Sibsagar at Molong (Molungyimchen) or Deka Haimong under the Deputy Commissioner of that district; and, thirdly 50 Lakhimpur Frontier Police should join in turn with their Deputy Commissioner at Jaipur. It appears that Colonel W. S. Clarke, the Deputy Commissioner Sibsagar was opposed to the proposal and preferred complete annexation straightway. Mr. Godfrey of Lakhimpur, however, thought a promenade would have an excellent effect. The ~~Government~~ Government of India replied in Mr. Grant's letter No. 2789-E., dated the 20th October 1884 a letter after which was quoted as a "Locus classicus" of policy for many a year thereafter, and ~~which~~ which in the words of Sir William Morris, written 37 years later, "Sanctioned if it did not actually initiate the policy of political control areas beyond the Naga Hills Frontier." They did not approve of the proposal for a comprehensive promenade. They preferred to adhere to the existing policy i.e., (a) that infraction of our border and ill-treatment of British

subjects beyond it should be punished, but (b) inter-tribal feuds and murders committed outside the Frontier should be disregarded. They expressed in indefinite terms their dislike of taking engagements and gave at length their reasons for this attitude. They were clearly opposed to doing anything which might entail commitments, a term which covered of course such undesirable eventualities as extension of responsibility, a series of expeditions and a widely increased area of administration. These instructions are summed up in the final paragraph of the letter which runs as follows;

"5. For these reasons, chiefly, the Governor-General is disinclined to sanction any very marked alteration of the policy at present pursued towards the tribes in question. But at the same time he considers that.....the existing methods of checking and punishing border offences should be followed when necessary. With increased energy and promptitude. He therefore approves of the arrangement under which the political control of the Nagas to the east of the Ithota country as far as the Jhanzi river, or any other point which you may select will be made over to the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills. All other details he leaves to your discretion with the reservation that interference with inter-tribal quarrels should, as a rule, be limited to those cases where they involve (1) outrages on British subjects; (2) violation of the Inner Line; (3) danger to the interests of people dwelling inside the British borders by reason of the proximity of disturbances outside, such disturbances, for instances, as would be likely to intimidate coolies employed upon tea estates or cultivators".

This decision was passed on the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills and of Sibsagar, but, as will be seen later, it was not long before it had to be modified.

In order to implement the Government of India's instructions, the Chief Commissioner then ordered the Deputy Commissioner Naga Hills, to make two expeditions (a) to a number of Eastern Angami villages along the Manipur border to the east of Kohima and outside the existing boundary of the Naga Hills district and (b) to a number of Ao village east of Wokha. The Deputy

Commissioner, Sibsagar, was instructed to make a similar visit to the Konyak villages to the east of his boundary, ending by a return to his district along the Dikhu.

Mr. McCabe of the Naga Hills, accompanied by an escort of 30 Frontier Police, accomplished the first expedition between December 23<sup>rd</sup> 1884 and January 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1885 and reported a highly successful trip in connection with which Mr. Elliot expressed his "extreme gratification" that the fame of British administration in the Naga Hills was "attracting the wistful administration of the residents beyond the Inner Line". Mr. McCabe started on his second expedition from Wokha on the 11<sup>th</sup> January 1886 with Mr. L. St. J. Brodick, Subdivisional Officer, Wokha, Dr. S. Boah, Civil Surgeon, and Captain Plowden, Commandant and 100 non Commissioned Officers and men of the Frontier Police. The objects of the expedition were—1<sup>st</sup>—To punish the Sema village of Nungtang (Litami) for the murder of a British subject. 2<sup>nd</sup>—To bring home to the Ao tribe the fact that it is politically subordinate to the British Government. 3<sup>rd</sup>—To determine a point on the Borodubia (St Changki) Waromong range, which should be the limit of the political control of the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills District in the direction of the Frontier of Sibsagar". They punished Nungtang, and then turned aside from their original route to visit the Sema village of Lophemi (Lumami). The Ao village of Nankam (Lungkam) had complained against <sup>them</sup> ~~the~~, and this village was connected with the other offending village of Nungtang

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Assam Secretariat File No. 40-J of 1885.

Military Report.

Secondly, they visited the Ao village of Longsa to the south on a complaint from Bo-odubia and Moldubia. To Longsa McCabe went via Ungma, the biggest village of the Ao Tribe. In both cases submission was obtained without difficulty. Thence proceeding via Mokokchung he met the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar (Colonel Clarke), on 30th January, the date fixed. The villages visited, except the Sema villages of Nongtang and Loppheimi were all Ao.

Mr. McCabe's conclusion as a result of this tour were clear and definite. In his letter No, 853, dated the 16th March 1885, he wrote as follows:

"21. In attempting to form any idea of the probable results of this promenade, it would be advisable to consider the object attained by Captain Brodie's tour in 1844. Captain Brodie marched from Bo-haimong to Lakhut, and took engagements from the headmen of the different villages to refrain from inter-village war., he had not returned to the plain before many of these engagements were broken, and the chiefs in fault refused to obey his summons and appear at Sibsagar. From 1844 up to the present time, these villages have carried on incessant blood feuds the Deputy Commissioner of Sibsagar has repeatedly sent orders prohibiting murderous raids, but, as no steps were taken to enforce these orders, they have been systematically disregarded. The Government of India has now sanctioned the extension of the political control of the Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills district to these tribes, and my chief in this promenade was to acquire a knowledge of the country and of the inhabitants, and to impress on the people my determination to put a stop to the cruel murder which have unhappily been so frequent occurrence during the past years.

22. The reception I experienced was of a friendly though some what apathetic character, and coolies and supplies were obtained without difficulty. The smaller villages would welcome subordination to the British Government, and the whole of the Ao tribe would view with pleasure security in trading with the plains.

The larger villages make constant demands on the smaller ones for cattle and daos, and in case of refusal a feud is established resulting in the loss of several lives. If murder

is to be checked, the causes which stimulate it must be attacked, or the political control over these tribes will be of a merely nominal character. Mr. Clark, the missionary, who resides at Molong believes that this promenade will check for some time the aggression of the larger villages. I am not so sanguine. The men of the Ao tribe have been so accustomed to receiving orders and being allowed to disregard them, that nothing less than the most severe punishment will impress on their minds the necessity of obedience.

I presume that the Government of India intends that this political control shall be of a real character, and it therefore remains to be decided in what manner it should be carried into effect.

There are two courses open:-

(1) To make an annual promenade during the cold-weather, when punishment might be inflicted on all villages that had disobeyed orders during the rains.

(2) To establish an outpost in the heart of the Ao country and exercise the same political control over these tribes as that now brought to bear on the Angamis and Ihotas.

The objection to the first proposal is that the punishment inflicted would follow at such a lapse of time after the commission of the offence that the motives of our actions might be misconstrued, and the inhabitants would simply regard us as a superior class of looters and murderers to themselves.

The second proposal is the one which appears to me to effort the only solution of the difficulty. Experience has clearly proved that as long as Government contented itself with establishing outposts on the Frontiers of these hill tribes, no efficient control was ever exercised. From 1837 to 1879, no outpost existed in the heart of the Angami country and the history of those years was one succession of raids of Assam and inter-village feuds. From the date of the occupation of Kohima, the development of the control over the most warlike of the Naga tribes has been clearly marked.

On the Sibsagar frontier outposts have been established for many years past, and nothing has been effected towards checking feuds which have caused the loss of thousands of lives. Under these

these circumstances. I think the Sibsagar Frontier Police might be more usefully employed if they were incorporated with the Naga Hills Police, and posted in the heart of the Ao tribe. A guard of 100 men at Uema would in my opinion, effectually control the whole of the country between the Doyang, Dikhu and the plains, and communication with Wokha could be maintained by a road, via Nankam, and the crossing the Doyang by a suspension bridge below Ao.

Captain Plowden, the Commandant of the Naga Hills Frontier Police, has given full details of this scheme in his letter No. 75, dated 7th instant, to the Inspector General of Police, and it is not necessary for me to enter more fully into the matter, pending the decision of the Government of India on the policy to be adopted. There is one point, however, on which I consider definite instructions should be issued and that is the alignment of a fixed boundary, beyond which no control of any description should be exercised."

Colonel Clarke who similarly had no difficulties during his tour of 14 days, considered that all the villages he visited should be added to the Naga Hills charge, and he agreed in general with Mr. McCabe's views.

McCabe's proposals did not entirely commend themselves to the then Chief Commissioner, Mr. E. E. Ward, I.C.S., who was officiating for Mr. Elliott. They are discussed at length in his letters No. 923\* of 11th June 1885 and 1893 of the 8th October 1885 to

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\*Assam Secretariat, 1885, File No. 40-J

The Government of India. "They seem", he said in the first letter "to go considerably beyond the policy sanctioned by the Government of India in your letter No. 2789-E., dated the 20th October last: (see page 103) above in the second place, they amount practically to a proposal to annex and administer the whole of the new area by adding it <sup>on</sup> to the present Naga Hills district, a measure which Mr. Ward thinks is certainly not called for at present; thirdly, the cost of carrying out these proposals is more than the circumstances of the case warrant.....; and lastly, the proposal to withdraw the Frontier Police entirely from the Sibsagar district and to abolish its Frontier outposts is one which would be sure to meet with much opposition from the tea-planting interests in that district." He then pointed out that the analogy which McCabe had drawn from the cases of the occupation of Samaguting in 1866 and Kohima in 1878 was scarcely correct. "The occupation" (he wrote), "of Samaguting and the subsequent advance of the Political Agent's headquarters to Kohima arose entirely from the necessity which existed for checking the numerous raids of the Angamis on British and Manipur territory, and also the state of lawlessness in the Naga Hills District which encouraged the Angamis to make these raids.

10. The Officiating Chief Commissioner does not find that any such excuse exist to justify similar action being taken with respect to the hill tribes now living outside the boundary of the Naga Hills district. In the first place, we have no longer the warlike race of Angamis to deal with. Then, again, raids by Naga tribes on British subjects are entirely on villages lying just ~~with~~ within the boundary of the Naga Hills district, the raiders having perhaps, scarcely yet realised the fact that all Nagas residing within this boundary are now our subjects. On the Sibsagar ~~frontier~~ frontier the hill tribes are peaceable enough, except amongst themselves, being too anxious to trade with us to be otherwise. Now was the ~~existence~~ existence of any such raids advanced as a ground for the policy advocated by Mr. Elliot in my letter No. 1263, of the 22nd August last. (See ~~page~~ page 103 above) Mr. Elliott's recommendations were based on the view that the inter-tribal feuds and consequent massacres among the tribes on the Sibsagar frontier were on the increase, that they bore ~~any~~ evidence of the growing turbulence

of the Nagas and the decreasing influence of British officers, and that if we wished to prevent this turbulence spreading over into the plains, some more stringent measures than exist at present ought to be adopted to check it.

11. In your letter of the 20th October last, you stated, with reference to Mr. Elliott's proposals, that the Government of India was disinclined to sanction any very marked alteration of the policy at present pursued towards the tribes in question, but at the same time considered that the existing methods of checking and punishing border offences should be followed, when necessary, with increased energy and promptitude, provided only that interference with intertribal quarrels should be confined, as a rule, to the three cases mentioned in the last paragraph of your letter. It is however, only in the last of the three cases mentioned by you that any real difficulty has arisen in determining the policy to be pursued;

in the other two cases, viz, where outrages occur on British subjects on British territory is violated, our policy is clear, and is being vigorously acted up to. It is only in cases of inter-tribal feuds not affecting British subjects or involving ~~any~~ any violation of British territory that doubts have occurred, giving rise to the present correspondence. In these cases the existing policy has ever since the days of Captain Brodie been one of absolute non-interference; neither the former Political Agent nor the present Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills district has ever since the time mentioned exercised any political control what so ever in such cases outside the district, and the question now to be considered is whether we should continue this policy, or if we interfere, in what way should this interference be exercised, what orders should the Deputy Commissioner be authorised to pass, and what power should be given to him to enforce his orders.

12. The Officiating Chief Commissioner observes that the Government of India desires that all interference in the particular cases here referred to should be confined to those instances in which danger arises to the interests of people dwelling inside the British border by reason of the proximity of disturbances outside, such disturbances, for instance, as would be likely to intimidate coolies employed upon tea estates or cultivators. These instructions however, only effect the question as to what area ~~may~~ now be brought under control. It still remains to determine the mode of control and the Deputy Commissioner's power to enforce any orders he may be authorised to issue within that area.

13. Upon this point, Mr. Ward would ask the sanction of the Government of India to his issuing the following instructions to the Deputy Commissioner to whom may hereafter be given the political control of the new tract or of any portion thereof. He will march once annually with a Frontier Police force through the particular tract assigned to him, and in the course of his march will enquire, whether invited to do so or not, into all cases of murder committed within the past year, and punish the village to which the murderers belong. All punishments should, in the first instance, be by fine, the amount of fine in each case being

The Government of India replied in their letter No. 246-B. date the 3rd February 1886, which was forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner with Assam letter No. 494, dated the 9th March 1886. While observing that Mr. Ward's proposals were "practically a step towards the amalgamation of a considerable tract of trans-frontier country with the British districts" they were unable to see how it could be avoided. They approved the proposals in general only observing that the instructions to be given were a little too stringent and inelastic and desiring that more discretion should be given to local officers, burning a village, for instance, was to be allowed as a last resort. The geographical area was agreed to, as also that it should be placed under the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills.

In February 1886+ occurred the Shipvomi raid, in reprisal for which two villages has to be punished. Three men of the big Angami village of Khonoma were killed while trading in Manipur. Their friend believed this to have been done by ~~men~~ men of Shipvomi (Tephunge), a Manipur village just across the border and on the 13th February 1886 Khonoma, together with a number of men, said to be as many as 1,500 from 15 or 20 Naga villages. took revenge. They burned and looted Shipvomi and killed at least three persons. Mr. R.T. Greer, I.C.S., was on his way to join as Deputy Commissioner when this happened. Arriving at Kohima on the 17th February, he at once went to the spot accompanied by Captain Plowden and was aided in his inquiries by the "Tangal Major", the Prime Minister of Manipur, a gentleman who was to figure prominently later on in the events at Manipur in 1891. He was satisfied that not Shipvomi, but Thetchulomi (Thetsemi) village within our boundary, was the original culprit and that therefore Shipvomi was raided and looted by mistake. Be that as it may, a number of Khonoma and

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\* Assam Secretariat, File 21-J of 1886.

+ Assam Secretariat, 1886, File No. 784-J-

left to the discretion of the Deputy Commissioner, Subject to the approval of the Chief Commissioner. If the fine is not immediately paid, its equivalent in grain or cattle may be sized. If no grain or cattle are found, the village should be debarred from all trade and intercourse with the plains until the fine is paid. In no case should the destruction of the offending village be resorted to as a punishment. In no case other than murder should the Deputy Commissioner interfere to settled inter-tribal disputes by making, or attempting to enforce any award. This does not, however, debar him from using his personal influence in inducing the tribes to settle their disputes amicably. Lastly, in no case should the Deputy Commissioner interfere in disputes between tribes residing within and the tribes residing outside the area of control, even though such disputes may have resulted in murder either without or within such area.

14. The Officiating Chief Commissioner thinks that if the Government of India will sanction the issue of the instructions above proposed nothing more is required. Mr. Ward is not so sanguine as to expect that the limited power of control which he now propose to give to the Deputy Commissioner will suffice to altogether put down the inter-tribal feuds and massacres among the Nagas whom it is proposed to bring under control, but he sees no reason to think that his proposals will not amply suffice to check to a very great extent that growing turbulence among the Nagas to which Mr. Elliott referred in my letter of the 22nd August last and so effectually prevent such turbulence from spreading over into our settled districts.

The area of political control which the Chief Commissioner proposed should be assigned to the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, was defined in paragraph 6 of the letter of the 11th June subject to some slight subsequent modification and, briefly it covered the whole Ao country starting from west of the Dikhu where it cuts the present Mokokchung Subdivision from north to south, together with the Sema villages to the east of Wokha.

Other Angami men were brought to trial and severe punishment was meted out to them. Thechulomi also was punished by being burned for their part in the transaction. Mr. Green had some severe remarks to make on the slackness of the Manipur administration. Colonel (letter General Sir. James) Johnstone was the Political Agent in Manipur at that time, and one can well imagine the measured periods in which, if he had not been busily engaged in connection with the Third Burma War, a campaign in which he was wounded, he would have trounced the young officer who had dared to criticise the administration for which he as Political Agent was responsible. Green's remarks, as a matter of fact, only repeated what McCabe had said in 1885\* on Manipur methods as the result of his own observations criticisms which evoked from the Political Agent, who must then too have been Johnstone, a spirited protest dated 20th March 1885.

There is reference in the report of 1885-86 to <sup>great</sup> trouble over forced labour for transport purposes. Unusual and heavy demands were made on the labour on account of the sudden removal of the 43rd Regiment for service in Burma, their relief by the 42nd from Shillong and by the breakdown of the Transport Department.

A brief reference to the growing of potatoes by some Cukhas near the station Kohima, in fulfilment of the wishes expressed by the former Chief Commissioner, Mr. Elliott, is worthy of record.

The report for the year 1886-87 is signed by Mr. Porteous, but he actually <sup>only</sup> held charge of the district for the last two months of that year, the preceding period being divided into three short incumbencies, namely, those of Messrs. Green, Davis and Grimwood. This last officer was Mr. F. St. C. Grimwood who was to lose his life as Political Agent in Manipur in 1891.

A severe though localised outbreak of cholera occurred in this year. It was brought into the Hills by Naga coolies who had been taken to Manipur on transport work by the 44th Gurkha Light Infantry. There were 350 deaths in the group of villages to which the coolies belonged and 367 in Kohima. In the Civil station of Kohima there was only one death, that of the European Subedar, Mr. Lyons.

The cultivation of potatoes spread further, but, as before, the Angamis refused to have anything to do with it and it was only Garkhas and Kukis who cultivated it. As regards transport, though the position might have been expected to be somewhat eased in this year with five to six hundred pack ponies working on the road to Nichuquand and Kohima, Mr. Porteous again makes strong references to the hardships arising out of forced labour, as many as 16,500 men being impressed during the year.

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File 734-J of 1386

\* Assam Secretariat July 1385. Proceedings of the Chief Commissioner in the Department under the control of Foreign Department of the Government of India No.13.

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Large sums of money were spent on public works the total amount being as much as Rs. 92,730. These works included, besides roads, the Kohima Fort and Magazine, both of which remained under construction at the end of the year. Rupees 9,000 was spent on the Khonoma. The Kohima water supply arrangements were completed in 1887 and actually taken into use on the 4th April 1887.

An interesting side-light on administrative conditions in those days is afforded by the fact that during the cold weather of 1886-87 Wokha subdivision remained in charge of the Head Clerk. It must be remembered, however, that the Subdivisional officer of Wokha had at that time neither Civil nor Criminal Powers. The gap occurred between the death from dysentery of Mr. C.H. Prish on the 4th November 1886 and the arrival of Mr. E. Muspratt on the 20th February 1887.

The usual promenades were carried out and Mr. Porteous remarks on the very hostile attitude of the Semas throughout. All efforts at friendship failed with only one exception, a village which was wise enough to see that it was worth while to be on friendly terms with the British, It was to the Semas to whom Mr. Porteous referred when, in his letter No. 841\* dated the 21st February 1887, he asked for permission to take an expedition against the "Mezami" Nagas to punish them for their raids since December 1885 on Eastern Angami villages, especially Chipokitami which lay just outside the

boundary but was an off-shoot of a village inside the boundary. As Porteous pointed out in the subsequent years' report, "Mezami" was merely an Angami word for "barbarian" and meant ~~nothing~~ nothing to the Samas themselves. The Chief Sema village was that of Sakhai, being the headquarters of the powerful Zumomi clan and the village which, thirty years later was to send a higher proportion of its population as volunteers to France than any other village in the hills, Besides Chipokitami they had raided in December 1885 the village of Phiuma (Phuyemi) and in November 1886 the village of Zulhami, both of which lay within the political control area. The expedition was authorised, and took place between the 26th March and the 24th April 1887. Mr. Davis, Assistant Commissioner, and Mr. Muspratt, the Subdivisional Officer of Wokha, accompanied the Deputy Commissioner, and he took with him as escort 80 Naga Hills Frontier Police under their Commandant Lieutenant Macintyre and 40 of the 42nd Gukha Light Infantry (presumably from the garrison of Kohima) under Lieutenant Robin. There was no opposition and suitable fines were imposed on offending village, while the chief of Sakhai was carried off to Kohima, to suffer two months detention as a lesson to his pride.

Mr. Porteous followed this up with a long tour through the Sama Political Control country first between the Tizu and the Doyang, and then northwards, still east of the Doyang into the Sema country which lies east of Wokha, the only display of truculence came from the large and powerful village of Seromi, who

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\* Assam Secretariat, File No. 131-J of 1887 and page 15 of Military Report.

were the prime movers in an attack on Porteous' rearward when leaving Lukobimi on the 15th April and had to be fired on. He ended his tour at Nunkum in the Ao country, a big village of 400 hused, at which village he signified his disapproval of the practice of head-taking by buting all their trophies. Thence he turned south-west to the lhota village of Pangti where Captain Butler was killed in 1875 and went back via Wokha to Kohima. As he says in his report the results were that the "Mazamis" were subdued, our knowledge of the Semas was increased and the ground was prepared for the extension of our rule. The Chief Commissioner's comments contained in paragraph 2 of Assam Government letter No. 1487\* dated the 29th July 1887 were.

"2. The results of the march, as stated in your 38th paragraph, are the protection, which it is hoped will be lasting, of the Eastern Angami villages from further aggression by the Mazamis the establishment, for the first time, of our influence among the Sema, most of whose villages had never been visited by a British Officer since the survey, and the commencement of a policy which in the course of time and feuds among these savages and prove as successful in winning them to peaceful pursuits as it has already been among the Angamis and lhotas".

A month later, in his letter No. 516+ dated the 17th August 1887 Mr. Porteous recommended, as a result of his expedition to Awe and Nunkum June of that year, that the four lhota villages of Awe, Awe Yanthamo, Pangti, and Okotso: Ao villages of Nankum and Mungatung; and the Sema villages of Hang-ung, Nangtang and Phissing should be taken into the area of ordinary administration, and that an outpost should be established at Nankum. His views were stated as follows.

"22. While at Nunkum, I was frequently begged to have an out post stationed at the villages and was told that revenue would gladly be paid for the privilege of being included in British territory. The same request as to payment of revenue was preferred to me by the gaonburas of Pangti, the principal of the four lhota trans-frontier villages. At present they said they belong to nobody, and were taunted with their position by their fellow

lhotas in Lakhuti and other British villages. A proposal to include these four villages in British territory was made by Mr. McCabe in his No. 353, dated the 16th March 1885, giving an account of his tour through the Ao country, vide paragraph 6. I am unaware whether the separate proposal, there referred to, was ever made, and, if so, with what result.

23, It is my decided opinion that not only should these four villages be included in the Wokha subdivision, but that the whole tract lying within the streams Teshi and Chebi might now with advantage be so included, an outpost, as desired by its inhabitants, being stationed at Nunkum. The tract I refer to forms roughly the triangular or wedge-shaped areas of independent

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\* Assam Secretariat, 1887, File No. 131-J.

+ Assam Secretariat, File No. 625-J of 1887.

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territory which will be seen on the map running into the eastern boundary of the Wokha subdivision north-east of Wokha.

24. The addition of this small area to the charge of the subdivisional officer of Wokha would not be felt. There is no village within it more distant from the subdivisional headquarters than at least one-third of the villages in the present subdivision.

The placing of an extra guard of 25 or 30 men at Nunkum would moreover, put no undue strain on the resources of the Frontier Police. The Force at headquarters has within the past two years, been increased by the strength of the out posts formerly kept up at Ba-pathar and Dimapur while no corresponding decrease for the establishment of new or the increase of former outposts has taken place. The proposal therefore, involves no administrative inconvenience.

25. From a political point of view, the establishment of an outpost at Nunkum would be advantageous in no ordinary degree. The present report has illustrated the serious disadvantages under which political control is at present exercised over the Ao and northern Sema country. Had Nunkum had ready access to Wokha, the feud between A-re and that ~~king~~ village could not have occurred. The complaint of Nunkum that it can get no hearing for its grie-

vances against lhotas is an old one. The gaonboras represented their case to Mr. McCabe in August 1834, vide paragraph 27 of his No. 3774 dated the 13th August 1834, and he could only suggest to them that if unable to reach Wokha through the lhotas country, they should represent their grievances to the subdivisional office at Jowhat, whence news could be sent to Kohima. The Ao country was at that time outside the sphere of any recognised political control, Now that it is within that sphere, it is, I would submit, our duty to see that the Ao villages have, at all events, the opportunity of making their wants known to the authority to which they are being taught to look for guidance in their relations with one another and with the Semas. At present this opportunity is virtually denied to them, as their messengers are, and not it appears without cause, afraid to pass through the intervening lhotas villages. So far as the Semas are concerned, their isolation from Kohima and Wokha is still greater. They are on the worst of terms with the lhotas, and but few of their villages lying between Loppheim and Wokha have in recent years escaped being burnt for quarrels ending in murder between them and one and other of our border lhotas villages, generally Chingki. In the tract I would have annexed to British territory are included three Sema villages, through which sooner or later communication with the outer Semas would certainly be established.....

27. To sum up the arguments for the establishment of the outpost I propose, which annexation of the country of its hither side:- We are invited by the population to take it over; the political result of the step in increasing our influence over; the political result of the step is increasing our influence over the Ao and Sema tribes would be most favourable; financially there would be a small increase of revenue, the administration of the new territory would give rise to no inconvenience, and lastly, the move would be a safe one and unlikely to give rise to complications of any kind.\*

It fell to Mr. Denis Fitzpatrick, who had succeeded Mr. Ward as Chief Commissioner on 31st October 1887, to decide this question of policy. In a note which he recorded on the 15th November 1887 he set out succinctly the general position as regards control. He said--

"2. Mr. Porteous' proposal is really an instalment of the important scheme advocated by Mr. McCabe in paragraph 22 (page 110 above) of his letter above mentioned, which would have virtually added to the Naga Hills district an extensive tract of country that it was ultimately decided by Government of India (No. 246-E of the 3rd February 1886) on the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner should be excluded from that district and be treated as an area of political control to be dealt with on the "promenade" system

Now it seems to be admitted by all who have from time to time considered this question, that it is our destiny, if not our duty, to bring these wild tribes more and more under control, and there can be no doubt that in time the tract in question, and a great deal more besides, will come to be included in our ordinary fully administered district.

The only question is as to the rate at which we should proceed and the answer to that must depend on a variety of matters the most important being those inexorable limitations of finance that happen us at every turn in this country, and the absolute necessity of completely establishing our authority within the existing boundaries of our district before we advance those boundaries further".

Further consideration and consultation on the spot with Mr. McCabe who had once more come to the Nagas Hills as Deputy Commissioner followed and McCabe's views were summed up as follows at the end of a note which he recorded on the 31st January 1888. "I would not advise the establishment of an outpost at Nankam, unless, Government is prepared to take over the administrative control of the whole of the country between the Deyong and Dikhu now included in the area of political control. The Chief Commissioner came to the conclusion that the time was not ripe to recommend the depositions proposed, and decided to hold his hand for the time being.

Mr. McCabe made an important promenade between the 13th March and the 7th May, 1888, in the Ao country, In his report dated the 24th May 1888, No. 190, on this promenade and on "the expeditions conducted against several trans-frontier Naga Villages in punishment of raids upon village within the area of political control" he observed that he was guided by the rules laid down in the Assam Government letters No. 494 dated the 9th March 1888 (see page 114 above), and 91-1 dated the 4th February 1888. He took with him Lieutenant Macintyre Commandant, and 100

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\* Assam Secretariat File No. 39-J of 1888.

+ Assam Secretariat File No. 39-J of 1888.

\* Assam Secretariat File No. 520-J of 1888.

See also pages 16-18 of "Military Report of Naga Hills" 1913 (written by Hutton).

Non-Commissioned Officers and men of the Naga Hills Frontier Police, and also Mr. Muspratt, the Subdivisional officer of Wokha, and encountered serious opposition on the 18th April at the Trans-Dikhu Ao villages of Yajim (Yacham) and Chithu (Yong) the latter being a separate 'khel' of Yajim, some 300 yards from the main village. McCabe had determined to visit them, as they had been guilty of raiding on the cis-Dikhu villages within the area of political control of Unqua and Akoa. Both villages were burned on the 19th and a number of casualties inflicted, on the 25th April he burned Noksen and Letum (Litin) also trans-frontier villages for similar offences.

Mr. McCabe sums\* up the results of this eight weeks tour in the following words-

"26. I either visited or received deputations from every village within the country lying between Pangti and Nankam on the south, the Dikhu on the east, the plains of Assam on the north, and the boundary of the Wokha subdivision on the west, and disposed of every complaint that was brought to my notice.

With reference to the results achieved by these visits, I would point out that from 1885, my first promenade in ~~the~~ this part of the hills, up to the present time, only three murders have been committed by villages within this area and inter-villages.

warfare has practically ceased, and I trust that the punishment inflicted on villages beyond the area of control will effectually put an end to the murderous raids that have been noted in this report. I enclosed copy of a petition presented to me, from which you will see that a considerable number of villages are willing to pay revenue. No difficulty whatsoever would be experienced in administering the Ao Country, and a European officer, with a force of 100 police sepoy, could in a few years bring this tribe into as civilised and amenable a state as that of the Ihotas and Angamis in the Naga Hills district, " the Chief Commissioner (Mr. Fitzpatrick who had himself toured in the Naga Hills in February and ~~XXXXXX~~ March 1888, forwarded this report to the Government of India with his letter No. 1441, dated the 13th June 1888, and in commenting on \*the question of bringing some portion of the area of political control under Mr. McCabe's report, "said that" it would of course stand on a new footing if it appeared that the people were really willing to pay revenue", and that he would address the Government of India again. He concluded his letter with a warm tribute to the work which Mr. McCabe had done in his long service in the Naga Hills, in the following terms.

"9. The Chief Commissioner, I am to say, cannot close this letter without adverting to the fact that the submission of the report herewith enclosed is the last official act of importance done by Mr. McCabe as Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills district. The Chief Commissioner views Mr. McCabe's departure from the Naga Hills with much regret; but Mr. McCabe had served his time there, and it was impossible to refuse him a transfer which domestic and other reasons led him to solicit. Mr. McCabe's

services have been so highly spoken of by previous Chief Commissioners that Mr. Fitzpatrick can hardly hope that anything he may say would add to the reputation that officer had already acquired; but having travelled with Mr. McCabe through the Naga Hills this year, and seen the good work he has done among this wild people and the feelings of mingled attachment and awe with which they regard him, Mr. Fitzpatrick cannot abstain from adding his testimony to that of his predecessors. He has rarely seen an officer who so happily combined the power of command with kindness of feeling and consideration towards the people."

Mr. Fitzpatrick's commendation only repeated similar praise which Mr. McCabe's work as Deputy Commissioner of the district during the 3 years 1882-85 had already earned for him from Mr. Elliott, whose resolution on the Administration Report for the year 1884-85 concludes with a panegyric on Mr. McCabe's work with "the influence exerted by the greatest men in Anglo Indian history over the Santhals, the Bhils and the tribes of the Darajat", and refers with satisfaction to the friendly way in which he, as Chief Commissioner, had been received throughout a tour which he made in the previous cold weather, a happy result which he attributed to Mr. McCabe's unusual qualities. Mr. McCabe subsequently became Inspector General of Police and it was when holding that office that he was killed in Shillong in the earth quake of 1897.

Mr. Alexander Porteous succeeded Mr. McCabe as Deputy Commissioner and in July 1888 he had to report the buting of the Ao villages of Mongsenbi (Mongsemyinti) and Lungkung, both situated within the area of our political control, by a combination of trans-Dikhu villages, news of which was sent to him by the Rev. W. W. Clark, an American Baptist Missionary, who had been established for some time at Waromang and Molongyimsen (Molungying on the outer range of the Ao country. Mr. Clark referred to the raiders as "Mozunge", but this is merely the Ao word for "bad men" and they were in fact, what are now known as Chans. They had already absorbed a number of Ao ~~countries~~ villages and were tending to press across the river to the richer Ao country. In this instance they were reported to have killed and captured no less than 173 persons in Mongsenbi and 44 in Lungkung. In his

letter No.426, dated the 26th July 1884, Porteous said.

"3.....The raids are evidently intended as a revenge for the punishment inflicted on Nakson and Letum in the late pre-menade. I had previously so far back as May received news from Mr. Clark that these villages were boasting of the vengeance they intended taking, but, as no messengers reached me direct, and no demand for assistance came through Mr. Clark from Susu which had reported the matter to him, I considered these threats as

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\*Chief Commissioner's Proceeding in the Departments under the control of the Foreign Department of the Government of India for July 1885. No.1067, dated 2nd July 1885.

+ Assam Secretariat, 1888, File No. 676-J.

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were empty bravado, not seriously taken by the Aos themselves, and I merely wrote informing Mr. Clark the villages, threatened were free to take any defensive measures they desired so long as they abstained from carrying war across the Dikhu. The threats made have been only too amply fulfilled, but it remains to be seen whether provocation of some sort may not have been given.

4. We have of late so far interfered in the affairs of the Aos, and the recent massacres are (so far as can be seen) so clearly the result of our late unfortunately futile attempts to protect their outlying villages from the attacks of their savage neighbours by a policy of punishment followed by withdrawal, that it would now, I respectfully submit, be inconsistent both with the honour and duty of the British Government to abandon them further to the attack of their relentless enemies.

5. As regards my proposal to establish a guard at Susu or Mongsembi, it would be useless to attempt to disguise the fact that such a guard must almost necessarily, to be effective at all be permanent, and that to render its position perfectly secure the annexation of the whole Ao country must perforce follow

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7. An expedition sufficiently strong to visit all the villages which combined against us, and imposing enough to leave no doubt in the minds of the inhabitants of the purposelessness of attempting to contend with us, will be indispensable for the future security of the Aos, with or without annexation of the country of the letter

In his letter No. 573\* of the 21st September 1888 he reported the steps he had taken to establish a guard in the Ao country for the protection of the villages recently raided. (Incidentally, in this letter he refers to the hostile tribes as "Mi-is"). He chose Mongsembi as the site for the stockade in which the guard would be established. He gave further details about the raid on Mangsembi as follows.

"11.... The attacks were unquestionably intended as a retaliation for the expedition against Noksen and Litam in April last, undertaken to punish those villages for raids on Susu, Mongsembi, and Lungkung. As I have now learnt, these villages suffered far more severely than could ever have been intended by my predecessor. Not only were several men killed by the small guard left by Mr. McCabe at Litam while he proceeded to Noksen but a number approaching 40. were killed in the jungles round the two villages during Mr. McCabe's halt, by a rabble of some hundreds of friendlyes who had followed from Susu, Mongsembi, Lungkung, Salachu, and other villages in the wake of our force. There is reason to believe that the one man of Mongsembi who was killed met with his death while so engaged.

The narrative of this massacre, and the looting which accompanied it, was told me with a manifest feeling of pride by among others one of the gaoburas of Salachu and he cheerily exulted

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in the prospect of being again afforded an opportunity of indulging those blood-thirsty instincts, which have now for some years had no outlet on this side of the Dikhu. He showed the naivest ignorance that the recital of those atrocities could be other than pleasing to me, although he had cunning enough to deny, when I put him this question, that any women or children had been slaughtered.

12. It is small wonder that, after losing so many men in addition to the destruction of their villages and the loss of most of ~~the cattle~~ <sup>the cattle either killed or carried off as loot, the men of</sup> Naksen and Litam should have sent round a cross, and with the help of their allies, taken a savage revenge of the villages at whose heads (with our aid) they had suffered so heavy a punishment.

13. The attack on Mongsemdi was made in broad daylight, about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, when almost all the men and many of the women and children were at work in their fields. A ~~duty, but they were apparently taken by surprise, and although~~ <sup>duty, but they were apparently taken by surprise, and although</sup> few men were on guard, with a devotion for which I could hardly have given Nagas credit, and which cost them all their lives, they stayed long enough at their post to sound the alarm on the village drum, which stands near the gate by which the enemy entered, it was too late to save the lives of the majority of the women and children then in their houses. The Misis swarmed over the village like ants, as one of the survivors described the scene, and cut down every man, woman, or child who was unable to escape, a few young children who were taken alive excepted. After taking all ~~young children who were taken alive~~ the heads they set fire to the village and made good their ~~retreat~~ retreat before the Monosemdi men could come up from their Jhums. In all, 148 persons were killed of whom 15 are said to have been men, 30 women, and the rest children, Lungkung was attacked at dawn of the 23rd of June, no watch having apparently been kept. Here the number of persons slaughtered was 40, 5 men, 20 women, and the rest children. Two children were also carried off alive.

For the future, his views were as follows.

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"18. Now that a quad has been stationed at Mongsemdi, the question arises of how long it is to remain, and, if not permanent, how in the future is the protection of the Ao frontier to be provided for. I take it for granted that an expedition will be sent through the Mimi country in the coldweather, but unless we take hostages, which it may, perhaps, be impossible to do, I do not see how any effective security against a repetition of the Mongsemdi and Lungkung massacres can be taken, without either annexation of the Ao country, or a continued occupation of Mongsemdi, or some other post in it which would be really equivalent to that step, and would entail many of the responsibilities of annexation with none of its advantage.

In considering the expediency of taking over the country west of the Dikhu, I may here point out that, adding to the list of Ao villages given at the close of Mr. McCabe's recent report, the large trans-Dikhu Ao village of Longsa, containing 1,000 houses the Ibeta group Pangti, Okotso, and the two Areas, containing 500 houses, the few Sema villages north-west of the Teshi river containing 350 houses, and Assiringia, Tamlu, and Mansang, which, are not Ao although this side of the Dikhu, a total of 11,000 houses is attained. Now, even on an assessment of one rupee per house, which, it is my own opinion would be all we could at first demand, this represents a large increase of revenue, while the services of a European officer being certainly no longer required at Wokha, in the event supposed, a large saving in the administration of that subdivision would ensue. The duties of the Subdivisional Officer at Wokha have for some years, especially since the semas ceased raiding across the Dayang, been such as could perfectly well be performed by a tahsildar on Rs. 150 a month. They were in fact, performed with success for nine months in 1886-87 by the Wokha Head Clerk on Rs. 30.

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Exception of Longsa, reside on the left bank of the Dikhu no e better selection for a boundary than this river could be made.

2. Location of headquarters and outposts:- Ungma is a very good site for the headquarters station. It is a large village firmly situated on the main ridge running parallel to the Dikhu river. The inhabitants are well-to do, and inclined to be exacting in their demands from the neighbouring small villages.

An outpost at Mongsemdi would be necessary to afford protection against the raids of the trans-Dikhu tribes, and this post could easily be connected with Ungma by a road along the ridge above referred to. In case of necessity the journey from Ungma to Mongsemdi could be made in one day."

Letter No.3293\* dated the 14th November 1838, was then submitted to the Government of India with two proposals, - (a) a punitive expedition across the Dikhu, and (b) the annexation of the Ao country.

On the latter point, the letter contains a valuable resume of the past history of our relations with trans-frontier tribes together with a careful review of the then situation, and the obligations resting on Government. Sir, Dennis Fitzpatrick expresses himself as follows.

"10...." the Chief Commissioner has no hesitation what ever in saying that if the present political control system is to be maintained, it must be with the obligation of defending the area political control against aggression from without, and as regards the limitation laid down by the Government of India, viz..... that 'the measure of protection must depend upon proximity and convenience' it is unnecessary to discuss it, because, so far as the Chief Commissioner is aware, raids of the sort here in question are always made by villages at no great distance, which it is easy to reach and punish some way or other. It is no doubt very inconvenient to have to go even across the Dikhu to punish the raiders; but it is a thing which we could not with any decency refuse to do as long as we assert the authority we do within the area of political control.

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Before the Government of India was approached Mr. McCabe who was now Deputy Commissioner, Tezpur, was consulted. He gave his views as follows.

"The permanent occupation of the Ao country:- I have always argued that no final settlement of our relations with the Ao tribe could be obtained without a permanent occupation of the country. The interests of the tea-planters demand that the hill tribes immediately bordering on the north-east frontier should be under direct British control; and once this is achieved, raids on the plains of Assam become an impossibility and the necessity of maintaining police outposts in the plains districts no longer exists.

No difficulty will arise in permanently occupying the Ao country. The tribe is well disposed towards us, is readily amenable to discipline, and has experienced the advantages of the protection we can give it.

The present movement seems to afford a favourable opportunity for instituting direct government, and it would be advisable to commence at once by laying a house-tax.

This tax should be at Rs. 2 per house, and I think little difficulty would be experienced in realising it. The enhanced security to life and consequent development of trade, the sale of rice to the police, whose requirements would aggregate 1,500 maunds annually, the wages paid for work on roads and carriage of ~~stones~~ stones, would all cause an influx of money into this country many of the Aos are opium-eaters, and it would taken but a small sacrifice of this luxury to enable them ~~to pay the house-tax~~ to pay the house-tax. If this tract of country become an integral portion of the Naga Hills district, it will be necessary to fix a definite boundary beyond which under no pretence whatsoever would any control be assumed. The trans-frontier tribes should be given clearly to understand that, provided they respect the sanctity of our frontier, we have no wish to interfere in any way with them. A natural boundary is preferable to any other, ~~and as the whole of the Aos, with the~~ and as the whole of the Aos, with the ~~tribes~~

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11. The question accordingly is, shall we stop (there is no possibility of going back) at the present system of political control, saddled with the obligation of defending the territory against raids from without, or shall we go a step further and by degrees occupy the territory, taking revenue from it.

This question presented itself on a small scale to Mr. Fitzpatrick on his taking charge here this time last year, on a proposal made Mr. Porteous to take Nunkum and a few other villages across the Doyung into the district (see correspondence ending with your office letter No. 563. dated the 16th March last). On that occasion Mr. Fitzpatrick was averse to the step, partly because, though he regarded it, now that Upper Burma has been annexed, as ultimately inevitable, and indeed a thing to be desired, that we should gradually absorb all the country between our present district boundary and the confines of Burma and Anipur into our regularly administered territories, he was anxious to proceed slowly and cautiously, partly because he thought the notional control system promised to be fairly successful, and had more over not yet been sufficiently tried, but chiefly because there were financial difficulties, the particular proposals then made by Mr. Porteous applying to so small a number of villages that the revenue which they offered to pay would have gone but a small way towards defraying the necessary additional expense.

THE NAGA HILLS

12. Subsequently..... the Chief Commissioner came to the conclusion that if so large a proportion of the people of any portion of the political control area extensive enough to pay the additional expense involved are found willing to pay revenue that there would be no great difficulty about collecting it from all, it would be unwise on our part to abstain from occupying the tract and collecting revenue. The consideration which chiefly led the Chief Commissioner to this conclusion was that if we go on for a long series of years settling the affairs of these people and protecting them against attacks from beyond the political area, doing for them, in fact, almost all they want, they will come in time to imagine that they have a sort of prescriptive right to have all this done for them for nothing, and when the time comes when we must realise revenue from them, it may be a difficult and unpleasant business.....

13. As to the necessity of the step, it is manifest that the chastisement inflicted by Mr. McCabe on these trans-Dikhu villages in the spring has had no effect whatever, and the Chief Commissioner scarcely ventures to hope that the further action which he now proposes against them, though a sense of duty and regard for our good name compel us to take it, will have very much effect as a deterrent.....

..... Altogether the Chief Commissioner, while insisting on the necessity of the punitive visit he now propose, cannot venture to think he is in a very much better position than we were before the recent raid. It would be utterly impossible to withdraw altogether within the limits of the present district. The force at present at Mongsemdi would have to be kept where it is and it is more than possible that a year or two hence one or more similar posts would be found necessary.

The question is how is all this to be paid for, and the only answer seems to be by taking revenue from the Ao's who on every conceivable principle may be fairly required to pay at least in part for the special measures we take for their protection

14. Further, as above observed, the recent occurrences make it easier to take revenue from them, and the opportunity is one which the Chief Commissioner would not allow to go by".

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As regards the headquarters of the new area he proposed that it should be Ungma to which place the headquarters of the Sub-Divisional Office of Wokha would be transferred. Finally he said.

"17. It only remains to be said that if His Excellency in Council should be ~~pleas~~ed to approve of what is now proposed, the Chief Commissioner would not advocate the establishment of a fresh area of political control in the territory adjoining the portion of the present area of political control now to be occupied, as in his opinion the result of doing that would inevitably be that what has now occurred would repeat itself, and we might be compelled to enter into payment occupation of that fresh area much sooner than would be convenient. It may be that when the time approaches for a further advance, those who come after us will think it well to begin by establishing an area of political control along the frontier. That will for them to consider; but for the present the Chief Commissioner would make the Dikhu our boundary in the strictest

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sense and have nothing whatever to do with the people beyond, except in cases, which he believes under the new position of things would hardly ever occur, in which they might venture to commit aggressions on the people on our side. It would further he thinks be a question whether we should not place some restriction on the people crossing the river from our side, such as is established on other parts of our frontier under the Inner Line rule".

The assent of the Central Government was obtained, and expedition with Mr. Pouteous in general charge assisted by Mr. A.W. Davis, I.C.S., and with Lieutenants P.M. Maxwell of the Naga Hills Frontier Police Battalion in charge of the troops, which consisted of 68 of the former's men and 32 of the latter's, crossed the Dikhu on their way to visit the offending tribe on 5th January 1889. This tribe is what is known at the present day as the Changs, but in 1883, they are referred to as "Miris" or "Mazungs, with their principal village as "Mazung-Jami". The

The Expedition was entirely successful and the casualties on either side extremely small. Porteous reported that 1 sepoy was killed and 1 wounded and 20 colliers spiked by panjis, while he put the loss of the "Mazungs" at "5 men killed, wounded unknown":- Mozung- Jami (Tuensang) was occupied on 12th January 1839, "The tribesmen had then no acquaintance with fire-arms and Mr. Maxwell remarks that they were so ~~un~~ unaccustomed to these weapons that they thought, as fire came from the muzzle of the gun, all that was required was a chung of water to put it out. In fact, in general he describes them as a "contemptible", enemy. The ringleaders whom it was desired to capture escaped but the tribes were reduced to submission without ~~an~~ any difficulty. Towards the end of this tour, Mr. Porteous visited the Tan-Dikhu Sema villages of Ser-omi whose attitude to him in his tour of April 1837 is referred to at page 116 above. Their defiant attitude was no less marked than before and "it was very evident ~~th~~ that it was interpreted as a sign of weakness that we had taken no steps to bring Ser-omi to its bearings, and, on the eve of our ~~an~~ assuming the administration of the Ao Country, it would have been ~~an~~ impolitic to allow such a feeling to get abroad unchecked. "Ser-omi offered no resistance and, as they made complete submission and were not in the control area, Porteous contented himself with warning them that headtaking must in future cease and exacting a ~~an~~ small fine of 10 cattle.

In the course of his tour Porteous halted at Ungma in order to examine a site near Mokokchung (Mokoktsu) which seemed to him to offer the most suitable place for the new subdivisional headquarters. He was able to recommend the site, provided the water supply stood the test of the hot weather. (Subsequently, on 29th May 1839 he was able to report that the site he had selected "on the eastern slope of a hill, about half a mile west of Mokokchung" has stood the test.)



THE NAGA WELLS

the necessity of <sup>the</sup> increasing the police force so as to provide for a guard at Lopphe<sup>mi</sup>, he would have liked to take over also the powerful group of 6 villages lying along the ridge from Lumokomi to Lopphe<sup>mi</sup>. As regards the second point, he was in favour of ~~the~~ including Longsa which would have otherwise been the sole Ao village outside British territory, ~~that~~ <sup>and</sup> he advised that Rs. 2 should be the rate of revenue. Lastly, he repeated the views referred to above about the suitability of a site near Mokokchung summarising his reasons as follows:-

"12. Summary of reasons for choosing the site near Mokokchung

(1) reasonable proximity to headquarters at Kohima.

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\* Assam Secretariat-1889. File No. 544-J.

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(2) Command of the frontier ridge of the Ao country with direct communication by the Khenza ridge with the west of the Ao villages, without necessity of dropping into any valley.

(3) Convenience of position with view to probable future extensions of the subdivision into the Sema Country..

(4) Situation midway between three large village <sup>Ugma</sup> 600, Khenza 300, Mokokchung 300 houses, none more distant than 2½ miles, and consequent facilities for <sup>procuring</sup> ~~producing~~ supplies and colli<sup>e</sup> labour.

(5) Suitability of site in <sup>height</sup> ~~height~~ and lie of ground for establishing a station."

At the conclusion of the letter, No. 1033 of the 3th March 1889, in which he gave his views on these questions, Mr. Porteous added the following remarks about slavery:-

"20. Not the least important question in connection with our assumption of direct administration over the AOs is that of slavery an institution which in the domestic form prevails widely throughout the tribe. Some rich men are said to possess as many as ten or twenty slaves. Slaves are not allowed to marry, nor possess property and children borne by female slaves are usually put to death. It is obvious such a state of ~~things~~ <sup>things</sup> cannot be allowed to continue in British territory, but the question arises

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is whether Government to declare at once all slaves emancipated with or without compensation or should we leave the institution to disappear by the slow, but equally certain, method of refusing to enforce the supposed rights of slave-owners? The latter system was that adopted, I presume unconsciously, by Government in the Kuki country, where slavery was, however, not so widespread as among the Aos, and the result has been that slavery has entirely disappeared. I believe this to be the wisest policy, unless the Government be prepared to allow compensation, but I have to request that definite instructions on the subject may be issued."

The Chief Commissioner agreed to including the group of Sema villages west of the Teshi, but not the others; he did not accept the inclusion of Longsa; he approved of revenue being collected at the rate of Rs. 2 and the location of the subdivisional headquarters at Mokokchung. (Incidentally, the missionary Mr. Clark, had pressed strongly for Wa-omang but this was rejected on a number of good grounds).

As regard slavery, the Chief Commissioner's reply was as follows:-

"9. Lastly, as regards your request that definite ~~instructions~~ instructions may be issued as soon as possible regarding domestic slavery, which you state prevails widely among the Aos, I am to say that it would be altogether out of the question to come to any final conclusion as to the manner in which a matter of such importance and difficulty should be dealt with until we have had possession of the country for some little time, and learned something about it. It is most probable that here, as elsewhere, the status in question involves, besides the incidents of mere social inferiority.

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SUCH AS, IN accordance with our practice of giving effect to native usage, are recognised all over the country, - exclusion e.g., from marriage with superior classes, exclusion from certain special tenures of land, and so forth, - and if from the depths of our present ignorance we were to attempt to formulate any definite declarations on the subject, we should in all probability either go on be understood to go too far or not far enough. in the one

## THE NAGA HILLS

case destroying other things besides slavery, and in the other appearing to extend our countenance to things which called for our reprobation.

The only instructions the Chief Commissioner can give you for some times to come are that you should absolutely refuse to lend your countenance in any way to slavery, in the proper sense of the word, and in particular that you should refuse to admit it as a justification for ill-treating or restraining the liberty of any person whatsoever. I am to add that if the practice of putting to death the children born of so-called female slaves actually prevails, you should at once publicly notify throughout the new tracts that it will be punished as murder."

The Government of India agreed to the setting up of the new Mokokchung Sub-Division in its letter No. 223-E., of the 28th January 1890 and this was formally announced by Assam Government's Notification No. 749-J, of the 28th February 1890, Mr. A. W. Davis, I.C.S., being placed in charge as the first Sub-divisional Officer by Notification No. 1491-G., of the same date. Mokokchung has remained the outlying subdivision of the district ever since and Wokha has lost its administrative importance.

11. 1890-1900:- The year 1890-1891 was a year of quiet, a quiet the more remarkable towards its close in view of the events in Manipur in March 1891, when the Chief Commissioner and 4 other British Officers were murdered. The Nagas behaved extremely well and showed generally disposition to help the British, there was, however, a certain amount of unrest on the Sibsagar border and so much apprehension was felt among tea gardens and other residents that a body of troops was maintained for 2 months at Sibsagar.

There was one exception, however, to the general record of tranquillity, not that it was of great moment in itself, but because it led to the raising once more, and in a new direction, of the question of policy.

## THE NAGA HILLS

In December 1890 Davis had to punish two Sema villages outside the area of political control which lay to the east of Wokha, Seromi and Ghovishe's village. (Tsukohomi), the former for the murder of an Emilomi man, and the latter for a more serious raid in which one woman and, 10 children were killed. Seromi which he reached on the 1st December, put up no opposition, and was fined 30 head of cattle. Ghovishe also put no fight, but his village burned as a punishment. (Seromi was included within the area of Political control ten years later, with the sanction of the Government of India given in their letter No. 1933-EB.\* of the 9th October 1900).

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\* Assam Secretariat, for, A, October 1900, Nos 46-50.

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With his letter No. 915\*, dated the 29th December 1890, Mr. Davis sent in certain recommendations for the extension to the east of the area of political control, so as to include the Tizu and Tata village, or, in other words, the whole of the Sema and Angami tribes, as well as the Ao village of Longsa, the only pure Ao village hitherto left outside our jurisdiction.

The proposal commended itself to Mr. Quinton, but his death in 1891 and the hostility of his successors resulted in its being shelved for many years. The attitude of Sir William Ward and Sir Henry Cotton is well summed up in Mr. Ward's note of 25th November 1896, which runs as follows—" I have always been opposed to extending our area of political control, which is always <sup>followed</sup> followed by annexation as in the case of Mokokchung subdivision. To annexation, succeeds a further area of political control, and further annexation, etc. All this annexation means further expenditure. North Lushai is had enough, with its expenditure of 5½ lakhs a year and a revenue of Rs. 7,000 only, we don't want to annex more hill tribes than we probably can help. The annexation of the Mokokchung subdivision was due to the theory started, I think, by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick and adopted by India in which I have never agreed, viz., that political control area implies protection by us of that area from attacks of the area

beyond. That practically means that to protect properly, we must annex and establish additional police outposts and establish political control of an area next beyond the area annexed, and so on, ad infinitum. The object of political control area is, I have always held, to keep people immediately outside our annexed territories from taking heads, etc., on our borders. We say-- "If you want to take heads, keep away from our borders I would also say- We can't undertake to protect you from the attacks of tribes beyond the political control area, and therefore won't interfere with your marching in other country and retaliating upon them if they attack you." Mr. Cotton endorsed this view on 8th January 1897\* saying, "I entirely agree with Sir. William Ward's views, and would strongly object to any extension of political control if it can possibly be avoided, but there is always the risk of our hands being forced at any time."

1891-92 was described by Mr. Davis the Deputy Commissioner in his annual report as a most disastrous year both for the Angamis and for the foreign residents. The former suffered greatly on account of the excessive impressment of coolies for military requirements, and the outbreaks of cholera and smallpox. No less than 20,500 coolies had to be provided during the year and that total did not cover those taken at Nichuguard and in that neighbourhood. The foreign residents of Kohima suffered "on account of the scarcity of provisions and famine prices..... consequent of the impressment of all available transport in Sibsagar and this district for military purposes and the high prices paid by the Transport Department for paddy for pack animals".

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\*Assam Secretariat, For., A, January 1897, Nos. 1-8.

+ The still independent villages of Macham and Yong are generally regarded as Ao, but differ greatly from the rest of the tribe in language and custom.

## THE NAGA HILLS

In 1892-93\* Longsa ( a hitherto independent Ao village whose inclusion in administered territory had been the subject of discussion in 1889) paid revenue for the first time. (Mr. Davis had informed them that they would be so liable when he visited the villages in April 1892, but, as was discovered 11 years later somewhat to the consternation of the Secretariat, no written sanction of Government to this order was ever issued at the time, an omission which the Assam Government requested to Government of India to rectify in their letter No. 428-Fo., + dated the 9th July 1904). In 1893-94 our hold over the eastern Angamis immediately east of the Sidzu was tightened and Chajubama (Chozumi) was taken in as a revenue-paying villages

Correspondence took place in 1895 between the Governments of India, Burma and Assam, arising out of a raid by trans-frontier "Chins" from the east on a village called Shawpu, just beyond the Burma border and about 10 miles south-east of Melomi in our Eastern Angami country, in which the Chief Commissioner of Burma Sir Eyedvic Fryer, in his letter No. 742+ dated the 25th September 1895, raised the question of defining the boundary on either side of the track lying between the North Chindwin District and Manipur. This matter was left by the Government of India, in their letter No. 1942-E., + dated the 23rd October 1895, to the Chief Commissioner of Burma, to the two administrations to arrange. They took, at the same time, the opportunity to reiterate their policy that "no interference in the tract beyond our administrative borders should be encouraged or permitted, provided the tribes occupying that track refrain from raids within the administered area. This principle of general policy should be impressed on the local officers concerned."

In so doing they repeated what they had said previously to the Chief Commissioner of Assam in their letter No. 679-E., dated the 29th March 1895. i.e.,

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3. "The Chief Commissioner of Burma has laid down, and the Government of India have approved, the principle that no interference with the tribes in this region should be permitted so long as they abstain from raiding on the country under our settled administration, From this principle the Governor-General in Council would be unwilling to depart; and should any operations be undertaken, it would be desirable to explain clearly to the tribes that the Government of India have no desire to enter into any relations with them, or to maintain over them any permanent control. The scope of possible operations should be regarded from the standpoint to this policy."

In December\* 1897 Captain Cole, now Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, visited the Sica villages of Kiyeku (Kiyekhu) a transborder village, to punish it for raiding Sakhai and taking 17 heads. He imposed the heavy fine of Rs. 1,000, but this was not <sup>realised</sup> ~~realised~~ and the village was burnt, and cattle to the

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\* Assam Secretariat, For., A, August 1892, Nos. 36-37.

+ Assam Secretariat, For., A, August 1904, Nos. 41-56.

+ Assam Secretariat, For., A, December 1895, Nos. 5-13.

+ Assam Secretariat, For., A, September 1895, Nos. 9-20.

\* Assam Secretariat, For., A, May 1898. 4-5-

## THE NAGA HILLS

to the value of Rs.400 were seized. A sum of Rs-150 was later brought in cash, and the rest worked off in labour on the Sema road.

The report for 1899-90 records a period of tranquillity, with one exception. The one exception\*, however, was an important one, the ~~accident~~ <sup>incident</sup> of Yachumi. In his annual report Captain Woods, who had succeeded Captain Cole, merely says he "met with opposition" from this village and had to punish it. The punishment, however, was one of unusual severity. Captain Woods, together, with Mr. Nowl Williamson, Sub-divisional Officer of Mokokchung, and 100 rifles of the Naga Hills Military Police under Captain Shakespear left Kohima on the 28th January 1900 on a Trans-Dikhu tour. The route he took was north-east from Kohima by way of Khyeku, which had been burnt by Captain Cole in December 1897, to the Tizu river. At Kukiyami (Huchivv) in the Rizu valley, some 6 miles from Yachumi (Yimtsung-Aenyr). Woods got information Yachumi's hostile attitude. He went there next day, the 8th February, and the incident is best described in the following extract from Wood's diary.

<sup>Sketchy</sup> "8th February-Kukiyemi to Yachumi and back, about 12 miles ~~Sketchy~~ after leaving Kukiyemi this morning, we found the path panjied; this, I think, must have been devilment of the part of Ghosishe or Kukiyemi with the intention of getting Yachumi into a row, because the path was quite clear of panjies until quite close up to the village of Yachumi, The path runs pretty level for about four miles, and then descends to a stream, from which there is a pretty steady pull up to the spur on which the village is situated, than the path runs slightly downhill to the village, when we got within half a mile or so of the village, apparently the alarm was given, and many men were seen running up from the fields into the village. The village was hidden inside a ring of magnificent bamboo clups. A number of men came out from the village in their full war paint with spears, daos, and shields, and executed the usual war dance. My dobasheg spoke ~~me~~ to the people, and told them that our visit was only a friendly one, and that if they put away their arms, no harm would come to them, but it was all of no avail, as they were collecting in numbers, and there would have

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been a heavy loss had they got in amongs my collies; I was reluctantly compelled to give the order to fire. It was only after they had ~~some~~ <sup>some</sup> losses that they ~~retired~~. We then entered the villages, but not without a good deal of opposition. The village had a very strong fence and the latter was heavily panjied. It was a very fine village with some 400 or 500 houses in it., the houses were all of the T<sup>a</sup>ns-Dikhu pattern, with a long main street and houses closely packed on each side of it. I had intended to stay the night here, but on account of the difficulty in keeping the coolies, who had been looting pretty freely all round, ~~and the coolies, who had been looting pretty freely all round, and the~~ ~~impossibility, had they bolted of getting coolies from anywhere else, decided on returning to Kukiye<sup>m</sup>.~~ As the village had offered so much opposition all through, I decided on burning it, and Captain Shakespear with the rearguard burnt the village. It is probable that this lesson to Yachumi will have a salutary

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\*Assam Secretariat, For, A, April 1900, Nos. 1-9.

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effect in this valley and elsewhere, more especially as Yach<sup>u</sup>mi had been having so much, and had such a terrorising name on all sides. Did not get back to Kukiye<sup>m</sup> until after dark. It was a long, trying day. One sepoy and my head dobasha wounded by panjies and one coolie with a spear were our only casualties. There are a number of very big villages in this valley. This village cannot be very far from Mozungjami. Elevation of Yachumi 5,400 feet."

The truth at which Captain Woods evidently guessed, was that the Semas through whose villages he had passed, had sent word to Yachumi urging them to resist. The Semas knew that heavy casualties would be inflicted and, following the column, decapitated the dead and wounded. The rest of his tour was uneventful and he visited a large number of villages outside the administra-

THE NAGAKKXK HILLS

tive border.

The Chief Commissioner addressed the Deputy Commissioner on the subject in his letter No. 199-fo- dated the 11th April 1900 in the following terms.

"..... It is observed that on the 8th February you were encamped at the village of Yachumi which is far outside the area of your political control, and were there involved in serious conclusion with the men of that village, which resulted in your firing on them at close quarters and killing several, and afterwards ~~the~~ burning the village which is said to contain 400 or 500 houses.

2. I am to say that the Chief Commissioner does not wish to take any exception to your conduct at this village. He has not reason to doubt that the circumstances in which you found yourself and of your party to fire upon the men of the village, and that <sup>cause</sup> ~~came~~ loss of life was <sup>unavoidable</sup> ~~unavoidable~~. But it is none the less deplorable that this collision should have occurred. Mr. Cotton cannot understand that there was any necessity on your part to visit this unfriendly village, and he does not look with favour on any part of your protected tour ~~which is a~~ over a tract of country where the British Government possess and claim ~~to~~ political control and where there is obvious risk of your coming into conflict with the savage tribes who inhabit it: He believes that on former occasions expeditions similar to your own have been undertaken without sanction, and this may be held to justify your procedure in the present case; but he wishes you now to understand distinctly that he cannot approve of such expeditions unless some special reason exists for them, and that you must not in future organise or make an expedition or promenade through independent territory outside the area of your political control without obtaining the previous sanction of the Local Administration.

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3. The general policy has been frequently laid down of discouraging interference beyond the Dikhu, except when aggressions are committed on the people on our side; and while the Chief Commissioner has no intention of laying down any hardfast rules to which it would probably be found impossible to adhere in practice he is convinced that it is desirable to conform to the established policy, and that towns such as you

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HAVE RECENTLY UNDERTAKEN BEYOND THE POLITICAL CONTROL ~~ARE~~ involved the risk of collision, such as actually occurred at Yachumi, and are likely to lead to the gradual extension of the area under direct administration in the Naga Hills and to political and financial responsibilities of a serious nature. The tendency no doubt is in this direction, but the Chief Commissioner has no wish to precipitate matters. The area of the Sema country under political control is sufficiently well defined with a natural boundary though it is not marked on the maps, as it ought to be. This area is within your jurisdiction, but the Tzu and Tita and Yungnu villages which you have recently traversed lie beyond it, and it is to prevent excursions being undertaken by the Naga Hills authorities into these independent tracts without previous sanction that the present orders are issued."

111. 1900-1913:- The Government of India to whom the Yachumi incident was reported agreed in their letter No. 1046-E .B.\*, dated the 18th May 1900 with Mr. Cotton's view of the matter and with his orders. These orders had far-reaching effects as subsequent events were to show, and eventually circumstances ~~XXXX~~ proved too strong and they had to be modified.

It is worth while recording that Yachumi itself does not seem to have taken the matter very much to heart, as Mr. W.M. Kennedy in his report for the year 1900-1901 says-" They are now on the most friendly terms with us and are anxious that we should visit their village, again, which of course is impossible in view of the present orders regarding crossing the frontier. The Yachumi people say that Ghovishe instigated them to attack

## THE NACA HILLS

Mr. Kennedy raised the question of controlling the area to the east in the Tizu valley in a letter No.486-G., dated the 1st June 1901 which he addressed to Government. He asked that he should be allowed to settle disputes across the frontier, and secondly, he strongly urged that the boundary should be extended so as to include the whole Sema country or at least that the Tizu should be made the boundary. At the conclusion of his letter he described the position which had come about as result of the orders which were issued after the Yachumi collision as ~~follows~~ follows.

"The Chief Commissioner may with justice complain that he is always being urged to extend the area of our political control notwithstanding his repeated refusals to undertake any further responsibilities in that direction, but there are special reasons why this matter should be raised now. In times passed my predecessors have from time to time toured in the Tizu valley, settled the more particularly on the western slope thereof, which is contiguous to our boundary. These tours, which were reported in diaries have at least the tacit approval of the Local Government. The position of affairs is however, now <sup>intively</sup> ~~entirely~~ different,

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\*Assam Secretariat, For., A, August 1900, Nos. 9-11

+ Assam Secretariat, For., A, August 1901. Nos. 27-32.

## THE NAGA HILLS

As, since the collision at Yachumi last year, stringent orders have been issued prohibiting officers crossing the boundary or having any dealings with independent tribes. I am therefore now precluded from settling a land dispute even a few yards across the ridge, which is our boundary and once the independent village close to us realise this, they will resume the former habits of rioting and head-taking, which cannot fail to react unfavourable on our own villages close by. I feel, therefore, that I should be failing in my duty if I did not represent the state of affairs to the Chief Commissioner, if I remained silent I should be bound to carry out the present policy of non-interference beyond our border, and the responsibility for plunging back the Tizu valley into a state of anarchy would be mine.

The reply which he got in the Government letter No. 327-Form :-P-3466, dated the 8th August 1901 turned down his proposals in singularly definite and unsympathetic terms. It ran as follows

2. In reply, I am to say that the Chief Commissioner observes that most of the arguments put forward by you and Captain Woods have been used before and will doubtless be used again in favour of an extension of the area of political control. Where there is an ~~ent~~ ethnological boundary it will be said that a further expansion is <sup>necessary in</sup> ~~necessary in~~ order to secure a food natural and geographical boundary. When the boundary is a natural one an ethnological frontier is declared to be the best. When the boundary is a stream it is proposed to push it on to the top of the mountain ridge beyond. When the watershed has been reached it will be found that political considerations require an extension to the bed of the next river below and so on ad infinitum. It is usually reported that the proposed extension will involve no increase of expenditure, but in point of fact such extensions always do involve directly or indirectly ~~additional~~ additional outlay and further acquisitions of territory at no distant date. It may be that in the present case it will not be necessary to establish any outpost in the tract, which it is proposed to take over, and that no addition to the

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Military Police force will be required. But it is quite certain that the prolonged tours of the Deputy Commissioner in the area of Political control and beyond it do impose responsibilities and additional expenditure on the Administration, which increase as that area extends.

3. The Chief Commissioner does not forget that since the present boundary of political control was laid down the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills have repeatedly interferred to settle disputes among the independent Nagas beyond it. There is always a strong temptation to do this. Under the important orders of the Government of India, No. 246-E., dated the 3rd February 1886, you are authorised to punish villages outside the area of political control for raids committed on villages within that area when this can be conveniently done. In practice it has always been found convenient not only to punish such villages but to make enquiry into and settle the disputes and quarrels out of which the raids originated. Your predecessors have thus come to adjudicate in disputes between independent villages and to punish disobedience of their orders. In making an expedition

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to an independent village it is necessary to pass through other independent villages and sometimes to halt at them with an armed force and to require them to furnish transport. In this way the Deputy Commissioners of the Naga Hills have gradually extended their control over a number of independent village beyond the political control area.

4. It may be admitted that the result of this has been beneficial in the establishment of order in localities such as Tizu and Tita villages. But Mr. Cotton cannot doubt that your predecessors would have been better advised if they had adhered more strictly to the spirit of the orders of Government and had avoided as far as possible any interference with independent tribes. Sometimes, as for instance, in the case of the visit of

## THE NAGA HILLS

Yachumi, which led to a serious collision and loss of life last year, expeditions or promenades beyond the area of political control appear to have been taken with no other object than exploration, and the Chief Commissioner regrets that the orders which were the consequence of that case, did not issue earlier and that it was not laid down long ago that expeditions outside the area of political control should not be undertaken without previous sanction.

5. Holding these views the Chief Commissioner is unable to accept your proposals for extending the area of political control in the direction of the Tizu river or to approve of your interference in the specific cases which you have brought to notice, which all relate to inter-tribal disputes in villages outside of that area."

The Chief Commissioner evidently drafted the letter part of the letter himself though he incorporated in the beginning of it almost the whole of a note written by his Secretary Mr. F. J. Monahan who, incidentally, while realizing the nuisance arising out of constant incursions into tribal territory, accepted the situation and considered that there was no help for it but to accede to Mr. Kennedy's request.

The advent of new Chief Commissioner, Mr. J. B. Fuller, promised a more sympathetic attitude to these ideas. In February 1903, apparently in response to enquiries from the Chief Commissioner Captain A. A. Howell, the Deputy Commissioner, wrote and Tita valleys gave many instances of outrages which had occurred and reported how at least one village, Yatsimi, had asked to be taken under our protection, a request which he had "with grief and regret" been obliged to refuse. In a later letter No. 2426-G dated the 24th February 1903 he made the following suggestions by way of remedy.

"I have the honour to inform you that during my tour along the border of the political control in the Sema country, many of the leading men of that tribe have come in to see me. They all complain of our present boundary, which follows the crest of a range of hills, and certainly it is by no means all that a boundary should be; For instance, within a radius of some six miles of Sevikhe's village are some dozen villages all on the hill, some on

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the other while some are on the crest itself, which is our border, these villages are.

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\* Assam Secretariat, For., A, November 1903, Nos.3-17.

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all closely connected by descent, marriage, and trade (such as it is), and their lands, which lie on both sides of the crest of the Hill, are inextricably intermingled with each other, what ever a red line on the map may mean to a civilised man, it has no meaning to these people, who entirely fail to see, where all are alike, by what principle Government should make such important distinctions. In their opinion, the best thing that Government can do is to take over the whole of the Sema tribe, or, failing that, to take some natural boundary, such as the Tizu or Tita River, forbidding the people on either hand to cross the boundary on any pretence whatsoever. There is a good deal in what they say, but the first alternative would necessitate the establishment of a Military Police outpost in the Sema country. Until the tribe will bear the costs of this outpost, the expense to Government is not justifiable. The second alternative is certainly an improvement on the present arrangement. A river is a natural feature, which the meanest savage understands, and is, to a great extent, a dividing line between villages and village interest, which the crest of a hill most certainly is not. I however, am not prepared to recommend either a natural or a tribal boundary. In a country such as that on the eastern border of the Naga Hills, inhabited, ~~such as~~ ~~as it is~~, by numerous tribes often much scattered, whose lands are limited by no well-defined natures, I venture to suggest with all due deference that neither a tribal nor a natural boundary is the most desirable, but a mixture of the two, the principle to be followed being that the benignant influence of Government should be exercised as far as can be extended without in any way increasing the cost of the ordinary administration of the British portion of the Naga Hills district. That this influence can be thus exerted beyond the boundary of

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our present political control, there is no doubt whatever. I am no advocate of exploring excusion unless specially ordered by the Chief Commissioner. It is from these that the present unsatisfactory state of affairs has arisen, I would, however, most earnestly request that these villages, which have lived for many years in peace and order, considering themselves under our protection, should not be given over to ~~such~~<sup>over</sup> description, of violence and outrage. Under existing orders the maintenance of peace and order is impossible, and I, therefore, trust that these orders may speedily be modified."

Mr. Fuller recorded a long note on the subject on 18th April 1903 in which he reviewed the past policy and showed himself to be inclined to favour Captain Howell's ideas. Further inquiries led to letter No. 1064-G from Captain Howell dated the 25th July 1903 in which he advocated the immediate declaration of control over all Angami villages; its gradual extension over the whole Sema tribe; and the application of taxation to the whole existing area of political control, to the 5 Angami villages east of the Tizu<sup>and to the sema villages lying between our border and the</sup> Tizu. He also made certain important recommendations about running roads through the country in question, proposals with which Mr. A.W. Davis, late of the Naga Hills and by then Inspector-General of Police, agreed. These proposals, as Mr. Davis explains in his Memo. of 30th July 1903, were a revival of those which were put-

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forward by himself in 1891, accepted by Mr. Quinton, thrown aside owing to the latter's death in 1891, renewed in 1891 and 1892 by Mr. Davis, again shelved, revived in 1896 and this time definitely turned down by both Sir W. Ward and Sir H. Cotton; and then again revived in 1901 and again disapproved by Sir H. Cotton. Mr. Davis considered that the political control area should be extended so as include every Sema and Angami village.

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He observed incidentally that the prohibition rule (consequent on Yachumi) had led to a "deplorable amount of bloodshed and numerous murderous outrages just across our frontier", and in ~~and~~ a note recorded a little later he states his opinion that the frontier line was "no longer safe as it was 10 to 12 years ago", a "direct result", he considered of the non-interference policy. He condemned the present condition of affairs as being "discreditable to our administration and unintelligible to the people who are affected by it".

The proposals which the Chief Commissioner forwarded to the Government of India in his letter No. 517-Fo--P./5295, dated the 23rd November 1903 embodied this advice in general. He reviewed the policy of the previous 20 years starting from 1834 and made the following recommendations: (a) that the present area of "control" should be formally incorporated in the district and house tax levied which would regularise the existing defect to position; and

(b) that the area lying west of the Tizu as far north as and including the village of Yehimixx as well as 6 villages, among them Sohimi, inhabited either by Angamis or by Semas who had adopted Angami habits, lying to the east of the said river, should be included in the district. He decided not to include Melomi or Lapvomi, though they had applied for annexation.

The latter ended with the following reference to the Government of India's order of the 18th May 1900 arising out of the Yachumi case:-

"12..... the Chief Commissioner ventures to represent that the decision of the Government of India in the Yachumi case, referred to in paragraph 2 of this letter, has led to a recrudescence of barbarism across the frontier. Previous to the issue of those orders the Deputy Commissioners were in the habit of making occasional tours beyond the boundary of the "political control" area, in the course of which they settled disputes which were referred to them, and punished recalcitrant villages, with the result that raiding and head-taking were kept under control. It was early brought to notice that the

stringent prohibition against crossing the frontier was likely to lead to resumption of murderous feuds by the adjacent Naga villages, and the numerous cases of violent outrage which have been reported lately shown that the apprehension was well founded. An annexure to this letter gives a summary of the cases which have occurred since the 1st January 1902.

With regard to the Tizu Valley, the eastern side of which will lie immediately beyond the proposal boundary, Major Howell writes:-

" It should be remembered that until the issue of the orders in the Yachumi case, the people in the political control, were as well

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behaved as those in any other part of the district. So were those in the Tizu Valley. This Valley is now fast relapsing into barbarism and the process has a disturbing effect on the villages within the control proper".

Mr. Davis writes:-

If the control area be not extended to include the whole Sema tribe, then the rule prohibiting the Deputy Commissioner from crossing the border without formal permission should be relaxed as it is very necessary that he should be able to settle cases brought by people within the control area against people leaving outside it.

\*\* \* \* the prohibition rule has, I am afraid, led to a deplorable amount of bloodshed and numerous outrages just across our frontier, which would not have occurred if the policy of the pre-Yachumi days had been followed of recent years.

While we have, of course, no definite responsibilities for keeping the peace across our frontier, our political officers can not but feel regret at the constant occurrence of barbarous outrages close beyond our border, which are preventible with out risk or expenditure, and the Chief Commissioner sympathises with their feelings. Both Major Howell and Mr. Davis earnestly plead for the

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relaxation of the rule that now prohibits the Deputy Commissioner from promptly visiting villages across the border and using his mediating authority to compose feuds which not only lead to misery and loss of life, but have a disturbing effect on our own people. Mr. Fuller quite realises the danger of allowing British Officers a free hand across the frontier. They are subject to great temptations to extend their authority further than it is possible to enforce it without risk of collision or of expenditure. But at the same time he is of opinion that cases arise in which short tours may be undertaken without any such risk and with great benefit to the people. Mr. Fuller would on no account allow the Deputy Commissioner to cross the border without his express sanction; but would be glad if the Government of India would permit him to give such sanction occasionally on the understanding that a definite programme of the tour will be submitted by the Deputy Commissioner for his approval, and that it will be strictly followed".

In this letter No. 291-E.B., \* dated the 26th January 1904, the Government of India agreed to the extension of the eastern boundary of the district. This effected a long strip of country from Yehimi in the north along the line of the Tizu which became, to its junction with the Hipu, the boundary of the administered area (as it is to this day) down to Sohemi (Sahumyu) on the south. Mr. Nowl Williamsom who was then Subdivisional Officer of Mokokchung (Subsequently, as Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya, to be murdered by Abors in 1911) went through the part of the newlyannexed country which lay in his subdivision in March 1904 and was well received: Major Howell went a week later to the villages lying to the southern part of the area concerned. He also had no difficulties, but he lays emphasis in

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\*Assam Secretariat, For., A, August 1904, Nos. 42-56.

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his report on the menace of the ~~Aikha~~ Aishan Kuki villages to the east who were "a terror to the country side" especially as they were estimated to be armed in the proportion of a gun a piece for 200 houses.

In 1905\* occurred the second expedition against Mozungiami- the first was conducted by Mr. Porteus in 1889-situated about 20 miles east of Mokokchung and known by its own Chagg inhabitants as Tuensang or Yemkhung. This expedition was sanctioned by the Government of India in 1901 and it started from Mokokchung on the 12th January 1905 with Mr. W.J. Reid; the Deputy Commissioner, in charge accompanied by Mr. Williamson, and an escort of 100 men of the Naga hills Military Police, under Captain H.A.H. Thompson, the Commandant. They arrived at their destination of the 15th January and found both the offending khels, Pelasi (Bilashi) and Chongpo deserted. These they burnt in reprisal for the killing of two Sema coolies and they then devastated the country and destroyed the possessions of the villagers. The punishment meted out is described as severe. The expedition, however, instead of staying up to 26th January as was intended had to depart prematurely on the 22nd on account of choleraic diarrhoea breaking out among the coolies. This prevented the operations being as thorough as the Deputy Commissioner desired and he would have liked to exact further punishment subsequently. The Chief Commissioner, Mr. Fuller, was however, sufficiently satisfied with the results, though it was realised that it was only Chongpu which made reparation while Palasi made none. Little more than 2 years after the receipt of the Government of India's sanction to the shifting forward of the eastern boundary of our area of control, the local Government again addressed them with a similar request. Their letter No. 6119-J., \* + dated the 7th June 1906, arose out of certain strongly worded complaints which were submitted by the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills on the 11th July 1905 regarding the state of affairs just across his eastern border, of which the following are extracts:.

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"4.....in the early nineties raiding on our immediate frontier had been put a stop to a great extent. Since then, as we have taken no notice of savage acts of bloodship, the country is lapsing into its former state, and if we maintain the non-interference policy it will be only a matter of time before it returns to the condition in which we found it. From a purely official point of view the present policy of allowing this harassing warfare to be carried on is an excellent one, provided there is no fear of the sanctity of our border being violated, There should be no grounds for this fear, however, if we were to show ourselves more across the frontier. I have said that the orders in the Yachimi case as regards touring across our border have not been the cause of the present condition of affairs. But these orders have had a distinct effect in lessening our influence across the border.

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\* Assam Secretariat, For., A, April 1905, Nos. 1-50

+ Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, July, 1906, Nos. 25-32.

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The total number of murders, therefore, about which I have received reports amounts to 545 during the last 3½ years. For the reasons given in my last Annual Report it might not have been possible to prevent the murders across the Tizu which during 1904 and 1905 amount to 130, But all the other 324 murders or an average of over 90 year, which have all occurred in a portion of the frontier not much more than 30 miles in length, could have been prevented without any increase to the Military Police - Battalion and without the expenditure of a single extra rupee. These figures, it must be remembered, represent only the numbers of murders about which I have received information. As pointed out in my Annual Report others must take place about which nothing is ever heard.

6. If the present awful condition of affairs is to cease, the

only solution as far as I can see is annexation. Let the country annexed be called a political control area if necessary, but let the inhabitants clearly understand that they are British subjects and as such they may look to Government for protection and redress in return for the obligations we impose on them as regards raiding. I have written at length on this subject in my Annual Report. If we cannot annex, I think our policy should be one of strict non interference. If a savage comes to us for protection or redress which we cannot give him on the grounds that our policy is one of non-intervention, we can hardly in turn, I take it place restrictions on him as regards raiding and expect him to consider the feelings of Government of this subject.

7. I would mention here that Mr. Davis sent a note to the Secretariat in about April 1903 on the state of affairs of this frontier. This note was written by him after seeing the village of Alisibo burning before his eyes on the 25th March, 1903 while on tour at Mokokchung.

In referring the matter to the Government of India in their letter No. 6119-J., dated the 7th June, 1906 the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam enquired "whether the Government of India would assent to the exercise of the authority of this Government in order to check the perpetration of barbarities by the inhabitants of village which lie a short distance across the eastern frontier of the Naga Hills district." They were confident that the Government of India will agree in the view that it is expedient to intervene for the prevention of these atrocities if intervention will not add materially to the responsibilities of British Government". The general lines of policy which Sir Bampfulde Fuller advocated were explained Thus :-

"4. Should the Government of India approve an extension of the authority of the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills District; the Lieutenant-Governor would advocate no considerable change of policy. He would simply move on the lines which were recommended 16 years ago and establish as area of Political control along and beyond the eastern frontier of the district. He has but little faith in casual 'promenades' or in isolated punitive

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intervention; and he believes that nothing short of a direct declaration of continuous intervention will put an end to the raiding of one village upon another. He is assured by his officers that such a ~~is~~

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declaration would have to be supplemented by a very small amount of punishment in order to maintain the sanctity of human life; and ~~the~~ their opinion is entirely borne out by our experience with the areas of 'political control' which formerly existed but have now been included in the district..... In the respect the Lieutenant-Governor ~~is~~ would depart from the policy of the past in that he would not attempt at present to define with precision the outside known, and the existing maps are not reliable. Moreover it is plain that the area over which our influence should be exercised should be marked by ~~xx~~ tribal rather than by territorial limits, and should be defined by lists of villages, not by geographical features. Beginning with the the southern extremity of the belt our intervention should ~~x~~ certainly reach the three villages of Melomi, Lepvomi and Primi....

The geographical limits which are mentioned above are, however merely intended as a general indication of direction. It is proposed that the Deputy Commissioner should be authorised to list the villages which should be brought under our influence, subject to the limitations that they should constitute a fairly compact area, and that they should lie at no greater distance than two marches from the present frontier of the district or than 12 miles as the crow flies.

5. If, as ~~is~~ proposed, the assertion of our control is ~~f~~ gradually brought home to the people, the Lieutenant-Governor is assured of extensive measures of punishment. If it is possible that some of the trans-Dikhu villages may be disposed to resent interference but it is very improbable indeed that anything further will be needed than a show of strength. Sir Bampfylde Fuller believes indeed that the great majority of the villages will accept without unwillingness an authority to which their neighbours are subject and which brings much material advantage in its train. There is no

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intention of interfering in petty quarrels. It would be our policy to suppress raiding within the area of control, and to protect villages within this area from being raided by those on the further side of them. The latter obligation may seem to involve rather wide possibilities. But the experience of the past had shown that the protection of the British Government, once formally assented, is respected by the tribesmen, and with the exception of the attack on Mongsemdi (in the Ao country) which occurred in 1888, the former area of political control remained practically immune from outside aggression.

The Government of India, replying at leisure in their letter No. 511-E.C.\* of the 12th February 1907, were far from sympathetic. They reiterated at unusual length and with unusual emphasis their adherence to the principle of accepting no responsibility for the protection of life and property beyond the administrative line of British territory" and the fact that they "had no desire to hasten the day when the outlying tribes would fall under their administration". They characterised the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government's proposal as being in position to their declared

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\* Eastern Bengal and Assam, Secretariat Political, A, March 1908. Mps- 1-15.

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policy, and, after reviewing the course of policy which had been adopted for the last twenty-five years, they pronounced themselves quite definitely as being opposed to any general change of policy. The only thing they would consider was whether there were any particular circumstances in the Naga Hills case such as to make it desirable to make an exception. They, therefore cautiously and without committing themselves, asked for further information on various points which they enumerated. The Local ~~Information~~ Government took a considerable time to reply to this letter and in the <sup>meanwhile</sup> ~~meanwhile~~ made enquiries from their subordinate officers. These enquiries elicited some striking facts. The Commissioner in a letter dated the 26th September 1907 mentions a peculiarly bad instance in which, in January 1906, 250 persons had been butchered at the fords of the Dikhu by trans-frontier Nagas, the survivors of which ~~he~~ <sup>he himself</sup> saw when on tour. Similarly Major H.W.G. Cole who had formerly been Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills wrote on the 20th June 1907 from the Lushai Hills where he was then stationed and pronounced himself in no uncertain terms of the subject. The only sensible thing to do was to accept as inevitable the ultimate absorption of all unadministered territory between India and Burma; if our advances in this direction were to be gradual, they should at any rate be constant, and the sooner the thing was faced the better. Thirdly, Mr. A.W. Davis, who was then the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills dealt at length with the subject in his letter NO. 584-G., dated the 6th July 1907 and concluded by saying that "We shall have no real peace until we have observed the whole hill area between this and the Chindwin. This can be done gradually and economically. As it is, the huge area of uncontrolled hill country between Assam ~~and~~ Burma is an anomaly". The East Bengal and Assam Government of which by this time Sir Lancelot ~~Howe~~ was the head, replied to the Government of India in their letter No. 5204-J., dated the 7th December 1907. They traced the history of our relations with our tribal areas from 1840 to 1904. They referred with regret to the effect that the orders of ~~the~~ Government in 1900 prescribing the necessity of obtaining previous



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letter No. 132, dated the 16th July 1903.

"3..... It is urged on grounds-which are in our opinion adequate-that there is no reason to apprehend that the proposed extension will involved military operations or additional expenditure. It will be observed that Sir Luncelot Hare concurs in the opinion of his predecessor as to the desirability of permitting the officers of the Naga Hills District to exercise some control over the tribes just across the frontier, and with this conclusion we are forced to agree. On a full consideration of the whole case, we think that we should be accepting grave responsibility if, in opposition to the advice of successive Lieutenant- Governors supported by the practically unanimous opinion of local frontier officers, we declined to take steps to ensure the safety of our frontier villages and to put a stop to horrible barbarities when we have the power, more especially when this end can be achieved without adding to our expenditure or increasing our political risks.

4. It is, in our opinion, sufficiently clear from the correspondence, which we forward for your Lordship's perusal, that fitful intervention and occasional punitive expeditions have in the past proved ineffectual, whereas as in areas of political control the protection of the British Government has converted scenes of chronic murder and internecine feud to peace and agriculture. The Secretary of state in his Despatch No. 107 (Political), dated the 5th December 1873 expressed the opinion that the gradual extension of British authority over these independent tribes must be regarded as inevitable. "The continuance," he said, "in immediate proximity to settled British districts of a system of internecine warfare, conducted principally against women and children, cannot be tolerated".

We desire therefore, with your Lordship's approval, to accept the proposals of the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam for an extension of the area of our political Control.....

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Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1908,  
Nos.32-34.

Ditto

ditto

May 1909, Nos. 21-24.

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In spite however of this strong recommendation the Secretary of State (Lord Morley) declined to acced to the proposals. he said (his Despatch No. 128- (Political) date 13th November 1903)

"I have considered in Council the letter of Your Excellency's Government in the Foreign Department No. 132, dated the 16th July 1903, recommending that steps should be taken to extend your Political control over the tribes in a limited strip of territory adjoining the eastern border of the Naga Hills District. To give effect to this policy, it is proposed that the Deputy Commissioner with an escort and surveyors, should make a tour during the cold weather in the tribal area in question, it being left to his discretion, subject to general directions, to decide what places to visit. Villages at a distance of more than 12 miles from the administrative border are not as a rule, to be included and no attempt will be made at present to define geographically the limits of the proposed area of control. The local Government have satisfied you that the policy you recommend involves no political risk, and will cause no increase either of military police or of expenditure. The cost of the tour, I understand, would be borne by provincial revenues.

2.. The force of the reasons that in 1873 led Lord Salisbury (sic), in the despatch to which you refer, to express the view that a general extension of British authority over the independent tribes in these regions was practically unavoidable, cannot be gainsaid. But in 1884 the Government of India found it necessary to define more closely the principle of policy to be pursued and they laid down, for the guidance of the Local Government, that interference with tribal quarrels should, as a rule, be limited to cases involving either outrages on British subjects, or violation of Inner Line, or danger to the interests of dwellers within the British border by reason of the proximity of disturbance outside.

3. The objections based on this fundamental and essentially sound principle of policy to the proposals first submitted, when Sir, B. Fuller was Lieutenant-Governor, for bringing the area of tribal territory in question under political control, were stated most convincingly in the letter of your Government to the Local

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Government of the 12th February 1907. The impression produced on me by what you then wrote is that at the time you were of opinion ~~that~~ that no necessity had been established for a departure from the policy of no-interference. You, however, though it desirable to refer the matter back for Sir, L. Hare's consideration, with special reference to the question whether, in the event of the track which it was proposed to control being brought ultimately under direct administration, the taxes to be levied from the inhabitants would be likely to cover all expenditure, direct and indirect, that would be incurred for its administration and protection. It is true that the Local Government in their reply speak reassuringly on this point, but they do not conceal the fact that the logical outcome of the slight extension of political control now proposed is the absorption of the entire track of country, 60 miles in width, between the Naga Hills District and the territories subject to the Government of Burma.

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4. It is with reference to these wider consequences, and not merely to those immediately following on the measures now proposed that the question must be considered and decided. I am not produce results wider and more serious than are at present anticipated. Nor am I satisfied on the facts as reported that it is at the present moment necessary, in the interests of the dwellers within the British border, that there should be a departure from the principle of non-interference by the extension of the area of our responsibilities on this section of the frontier.

5. I am therefore compelled to withhold sanction from the measure which you submit for my approval".

The proposal was not <sup>to</sup> be raised again till six years later. A separate proposal as regards coal-bearing tracts, had in October 1907 (Our No. 4461-J, dated the 23rd October 1907) already been sent up to the Government of India where by the village of Kongan (kongnyu) east of the Dikhu river, which then formed the eastern boundary of the Mokokchung subdivision, should be included in the district. This was a large coal-bearing area and business interests desired to exploit it. The effect of the proposal

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was to include the whole country lying between the Dikhu and Safrau river. This was followed by a further letter No.2384-J+ dated the 13th May 1908 in which the inclusion of an extended area covering the whole of that part of the subdivision now lying between the Dikhu and its present north-east and south boundaries and including such places as Bo-jan, Wakching, Wanchin and Longkhai was recommended. The Government of India had apparently no great difficulty in acceding to this proposal and sanctioned it in their letter No.2292-F.C., dated the 1st July 1908.

Further correspondence ended in Notification No. 68-p.,+ dated the 1st February 1910, which added 14 Konyak villages between the Yangyu and the Safrai to the district. The boundaries with which it describes hold good to this day. The only difference is that there is now beyond this boundary a control area which includes the important villages of Mon and Chi and which stretches south of them for many miles down to the Sama Country. It is interesting to observe in the light of subsequent events that the then Subdivisional Officer of Kokochung, Mr. Needham, had written on the 1st November, 1909 and pointed out the influence which these two villages exerted over villages within this territory and the necessity of explaining to them that they would no longer be allowed to interfere. In the District Report for 1914-15 it is recorded that the Nazira Coal Company worked the No-jan Colliery throughout the year, output being 773.

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Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1908, Nos 32-34.

Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, May 1909, Nos. 21-24.

\*Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, November 1907, Nos. 101-114.

+Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, July 1900, Nos. 7-15.

+Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Political, A, July 1910, Nos. 23-54.

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In October 1903 Mr. W.G.M. Dundas, I.P., the Subdivisional Officer Mokokchung, reported fresh misconduct by Mozungjami. The Pelasi and Chongpo khels of Mozungjami had in 1903 committed certain outrages and were in consequence visited in 1903 ~~xxxx~~ by the then Deputy Commissioner (see page 141 ante). But full punishment was not exacted, and up to 1903 Pelasi were still in arrears with their fine and it was Chongpo who had committed the fresh outrage reported by Mr. Dundas in October. Sir Lancelot Hare decided to put an end to the unsatisfactory position and he obtained the agreement of the Central Government in their letter No.1041-E.B dated the 23rd June 1909 to sending an expedition. The expedition was entirely successful and its doings were reported in laudatory terms to the Supreme Government in the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government's letter No. #68-P., dated the 1st March 1910. Colonel Woods was in political charge as Deputy Commissioner with Major-Bliss, who was then Commandant of ~~100 Military~~ the Naga Hills Military Police, in charge of the escort of 100 Military Police. They left Mokokchung on 20th December 1909, reached Mozungjami on the 24th, remained there on the 25th and left on the 26th. The ~~xxxxxxx~~ In his behaviour of the Nagas was irreproachable, so Colonel Woods contented himself with imposing an additional fine of 5 mithun on the Pelasi khel. In his report the doings of Chongpo are not mentioned. The current Mozungjami version of this expedition is perhaps worth recording. According to it the first demand of the Sirkar was for the men responsible for the ~~xxxxxxdmandxxxxxxx~~ outrage. To this Tuensang replied "Does a hunter give away his hounds"? The next demand was for a fine in money. To this reply was, "We have no coins. We hear the Sirkar makes coins. If they are short, let them make some more". The final demand was for mithun. To this no reply was given, and the expedition had to toil many weary miles only to find them tied up ready outside the gates.

The Expedition of 1910 against the Aishan Kukis, a tribe who had been continually oppressing the local Nagas on our ~~xxxx~~ border in the most brutal way, originated in the murder at Melom in 1909 of two British subjects of Temimi (Kizare) village.

In Major-Howell's letter No.421-G., dated the 8th June 1909,

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he explained that these troublesome people belonged to a wild tract lying between the eastern border of Manipur and the Chindwin river, which extended to the north to a point beyond the Tizu. There were two groups of Kukis, the Aishan Kukis, who occupied the area to the south, separated from the Lanien valley by a high range of mountains.

Between the two groups lay the Soma tract inhabited by Tangkul Naras. In reporting the matter to the Government of India in their letter No.4079, dated the 5th August 1909, the Local Government referred to the Temimi murder and also to two raids which had been made by the same people into Manipur territory from Kangzang (Kanjang near Lapvome (Lephoi) in unadministered territory. The expedition was agreed to. It

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Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, July 1910,  
Nos.55-96.

\*Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, August 1910,  
Nos. 61-129.

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It was on a fairly large scale, the escort consisting of the Naga Hills Military, under the command of Major Bliss with two British Officers, Captain G.F.Porter of the 17th Infantry and Lieutenant Hardcastle, Assistant Commandant of the Police. Mr. Cosgrave, Vice-President of the Manipur State Durbar, joined the expedition at Melomi. It reached Kangjang on the 19th February where the Chief was arrested and kept in custody. On the 23rd February it reached Yangnoi where similar arrests were made. On the 5th March it returned to Kohima. There was no opposition throughout, but Colonel Woods reported that local conditions were such as to require drastic action. He proposed and he started carrying out this proposal - that all Kukis should be disarmed (by the 31st May he had surrendered <sup>to</sup> him 116 guns). Secondly, he considered that all Kukis should be ordered to return to their original homes in Manipur. Thirdly, he left a substantial guard at Melomi which was to remain there until his orders had been carried out. As regards Melomi and Pimi, though the paragraph in Woods report referring to them were left out when his report was forwarded to

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over the villages and told them so at the time; Woods stated this in a note recorded on the 16th November 1912, and this was confirmed by the then Chief Secretary. Next he decided to keep seven prominent men, as well as the Aishan "raja", a semi-imbecile boy, as hostages until the fine was paid and the orders carried out. Lastly, he advised that Komyang and his Chased Kukis should be warned that they must restrict themselves to the territory south of the mountain range previously referred to. This Chief and his men dominated the Somra Tract which is geographically in Burma and shut off by high mountains from the Lanein valley. The Government of Burma were asked to inform Komyang of these orders and they agreed to do so. The letter No. 380-P., from the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government reporting the results of the expedition to the Government of India, which is dated the 30th May 1910, is somewhat inconclusive but presumably Government were waiting to see the effect of the orders which it was proposed to issue to the Kukis. One point which they did make was that Melomi and Primi had rendered Government the fullest assistance and that "it would be impossible to abandon them to the revenge of these bloodthirsty savages" (Paragraph 4 of the letter).

In 1910-11, the principal event was the expedition in collaboration with Burma to Makgare a village situated "high up on the great divide between Assam and Burma at an elevation of some 7,000 feet in a desolate valley surrounded with mountains covered with snow" and overlooked by the great mountain of Saramati (12,557). In reprisal for a raid committed in January 1910 on the frontier village of Naugmo in the Upper Chinwin District of Burma. (As regards the place-names, Colonel Woods comments as follows in his report: "I have not been able to ascertain where the name Saramati came from.

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\* Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, July 1913, Nos. 67-73.

Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, August 1911, Nos. 13-31.

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Among the Eastern Angamis the hill is called Mak-iketū, the Thechumi people call it Atso, and Melomi, Puchimi, etc., call it Mera, nowhere is the name of Saramati known.....  
The name Makware is not known on this side, and the Makwares themselves call their village Dzulechili, and the neighbouring villages call it Gulechiri.) The Assam Column was under Lieutenant Colonel Woods and consisted of Major C. Bliss, Commandant, Lieutenant Hardcastle, Assistant Commandant and 100 rank and file of the Naga Hills Military Police, Captain R.H. Leet, I.M.S., Captain V.R. Officer and Mr. Pascoe of the Geological Survey of India. Colonel Woods had arranged that the Burma Column which was under Mr. W. Street Assistant Commissioner, with Captain J. Simpson, Burma Military Police, should meet the Assam Force at or near Thechumi on January 15th. Street, however, encountered tremendous difficulties on the route and eventually marched into Woods camp at Puchimi on January 20th. They were therefore 10 days behind schedule when the combined force started off on the 25th January from Thechumi on the march to Makware, which they reached on the 31st January. They had to open fire before entering the village, killing 5 Nagas, but there was no further opposition. The village was burnt and the two Columns returned in 1st February to their respective bases. Commenting on the Expedition to the Government of India in their letter No. 294-P. dated the 6th May 1911, the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government ~~XX~~ wrote.

"Under the most favourable circumstances the march from Tetchanasami to Makware or Dzulechili, as it would appear to be more correctly called, would be an arduous one; the ridges over 8,000 feet in height having to be crossed before the village is reached. But the circumstances unfortunately were far from favourable and the force was exposed to great discomfort from the exceedingly inclement weather. It speaks well for the physique of the men and coolies employed and of the excellent management of the expedition that these hardships were attended with so little actual sickness.

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4. On the 31st of January 1911 the expedition reached Makware, and as the villagers declined to come in or to lay down their arms, the political Officer had no option but to fire upon them, for, as he rightly observes, to enter the village with men armed with crossbows concealed on every side, would have entailed serious and absolutely unjustifiable loss upon our men. The punishment inflicted upon Makware was severe; but in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion it was in no way excessive. The murderous character of the inhabitants of these hills is unfortunately too well known and the knowledge by the tribesmen that Government is alike able and willing to punish wrong-doers with a heavy hand is the one thing which checks the perpetration of the most atrocious outrages. His Honour regrets that *it was not possible to recover the captive boy, but he has little doubt* that with two hostages in the hands of the Burma Government there will be no difficulty in arranging for his surrender.

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5. The immediate object of the expedition was attained and the results are likely to be far-reaching. The junction of the Burma and the Naga Hills forces cannot fail to produce a great effect upon all the tribesmen living in this locality. The Political Agent of Manipur has already taken the opportunity to point out to Komyang, the "uki Chief, who, from time to time has given trouble in the Somra basin that this junction has taken place and that Komyang can no longer hope to be able to trek to the north and east beyond the reach of the British Government and that his only chance is therefore to live quietly and peacefully with his neighbours and not provoke the wrath of a Government from which there can be no escape. All the villages lying in the valleys near the Somra range have learnt that their remoteness and isolation *can protect them* and this knowledge cannot fail to have a restraining effect upon their murderous propensities".

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In August 1910\* Colonel J. Shakespear, the Political Agent in Manipur, addressed the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government and asked for permission to lead an expedition in order to punish the Kuki villages of Limkhuthang (Lettkuthang) and Pafang for certain outrages which they had committed against Manipur Subjects. He also urged very strongly that it was time that the Somra Tract, in which these villages lay, should be brought under control. He considered, like most others, that Somra should naturally be administered by Burma. Sanction was given and Shakespear led an expedition which consisted of a company of the 17th Native Infantry under Captain B.J. Fagan and some men of the Manipur State Military Police to these villages in February 1911. The offending villages were duly punished and one of them, ~~Shuntred~~<sup>P</sup>, was burnt. Colonel Shakespear reported that "the effect of the promenade has been ~~xxx~~ very good." The Proposal as regards taking over the Somra Tract was not then accepted by Government as a feasible proposition.

Chinglong 1910-1913. on 23th June 1910 Mr. J. Needham, Sub-Divisional Officer, Mokokchung (a son of F.J. Needham of Sadiya fame) reported a raid by the Konyak Village of Chinglong from across the Yantu on Chingtang, a village across the Dikhu but inside our newly annexed Konyak territory (vide Notification No. 68-P., dated the 1st February 1910). He proposed to visit the village in the cold weather. Later on the 17th November 1910 he reported a further complication, i.e., a raid by Longkai, one of our newly <sup>annexed</sup> ~~annexed~~ trans-Dikhu villages, on Mongne across our border.

In a demi-official letter No. 62-P., dated 23th January 1911, the Commissioner's attention was drawn to the Government of India's orders contained in their letter No. 1046-E., dated the 18th May 1900, which laid down restrictions on operations on the border. The Commissioner, <sup>e</sup> however, replied that there was little risk like to arise out of a visit to Chinglong. The orders issued to Mr. Needham were that he was to visit Chinglong only if the Chinglong people refused to attend an enquiry which he was directed to

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\*Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, January 1911,  
No. 16-38.  
+Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, August 1911,  
No. 2-12-  
Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., B, August 1911,  
Nos. 39-82.

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To make; and he was given no authority to inflict any punishment. It appears that he took an escort of 80 men of the Naga Hills Military Police under Captain Hamilton and held an enquiry at Chingtang. Four of the Chinglong men came in and he took their statements. He found that the fault lay with the Chingtang people and the Longkai people and he was inclined to treat the doings of Chinglong with considerable leniency. Be that as it may, he marched on Chinglong on the 4th February 1911. The reasons he gave in his report were that the four men who came to meet him at Chingtang were not Chiefs, that the Chinglong Chiefs who had notice to come in had refused and therefore he decided to go to them. They resisted. He retaliated by firing on them and he burnt the village. His conduct received the severe condemnation of Government, the Chief Secretary remarking that it was most improper and the Commissioner also characterised his behaviour as showing a "Lamentable lack of discretion and disobedience of orders". An explanation was called for, but was not accepted as satisfactory. The Commissioner commented\* that Mr. Needham's action ".... was as unjustifiable as it was certainly against order.....". From the tone of the explanation it is clear that Mr. Needham entirely fails to realise his position and that he was determined to visit the village and inflict punishment at all hazards." Government agreed an expression of their displeasure was conveyed to Mr. Needham and he was transferred from the subdivision.

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Chinglong again became prominent in 1912. In August of that year, when Mr. J.E. Webster was Deputy Commissioner, certain British subjects of Wanching were murdered by 6 independent Nagas of Chinglong from across the border opposite Wanching and an expedition to punish the offenders was sanctioned. Before the expedition could start further raids took place which were attributed to Chinglong and it was apparent that the 3 Villages of the Totok group as well as Chinglong and Chongwe were in a truculent mood. The temper also of the villages within our border, recently annexed, was uncertain, and there was danger in the possible attitude of Mon and Chi in unadministered territory. Assam was short of military police owing to the Abor and Mishimi surveys which had absorbed 1,100 men for escorts, and had recourse to borrowing 150 men of the Dacca Military Police Battalion under Captain H.G. Bally Commandant and Lieutenant E.D. Dallas-Smith, Assistant Commandant.

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\*Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., B, March 1912  
Nos. 135-193.

\*Eastern Bengal and Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, January 1913,  
Nos. 1-39.

Mr. J.P. Mills comments as follows on this incident.

"Chinglong's confession, which I believe to be true, has always been that they handed over the real cuprits, but that Wanching persuaded the Sub-divisional Officer to believe that they were substituted slaves. Chinglong, having done their best to carry out orders, then decided that all they could do was to fight and the opinion of their neighbours was strongly on their side. After their punishment in 1911 it was hardly likely that they would be wantonly defiant\*.

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This force with 40 men of the Naga Hills Military Police under Captain J. Hardcastle was under the general command of Lieutenant-colonel G.H. Loch, C.I.E., Commandant of the Lushai Hills Battalion. The instructions to the expedition given in Government letter No. 376-P., dated the 22nd January 1913 were to demand the surrender of the murderers together with such reparation and punishment as was suitable, and permission was included to make a friendly visit to Mon<sup>and</sup> Chi. The force entered and burnt Chinglong on 5th February 1913. But as the main force were carrying out the operation, the Nagas made a determined attack on and stampeded the baggage train, killing 4 sepoy and 9 coolies, wounding 5 sepoy and 27 coolies and carrying off 3 rifles. The coolies were so demoralised that Colonel Loch decided to retire from Chinglong to Chingphoin British territory. In so doing he was actuated by what he considered to be the inadequacy of his force; by the difficulties on account of water; and because he thought that the season was too advanced. He proposed to wait to resume operations until the cold weather. The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Webster, on the other hand, wanted to undertake immediately the punishment of the offending villages and the Chief Commissioner agreed with him in holding that the season was not too advanced; that the water problem was not insuperable; and lastly, that it was most important that retribution should not be postponed. The Government of India was addressed accordingly, on the 15th February 1913 <sup>pointing out</sup> during the immediate necessity of action and asking for the assistance of regular troops in the shape of 200 men of the 1/8th Gurkhas. The Central Government sent down Sir James Willcocks, the General Officer Commanding, Northern Army, to report. He recommended that the expedition should be sanctioned, that Colonel Loch should be sent back to the Lushai Hills and that Major Alban Wilson, D.S.O., of the Gurkhas should take command of the Expedition. The Government of India agreed to this and stated that the officer commanding the police part of the force must be junior to Major Wilson. This, of course necessitated the dropping of Colonel Loch. An interesting commentary on the whole incident is to be

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found in a demi-official letter dated the 26th February 1913 from Colonel Woods, who was then Inspector-General of Police, but had spent many years in the Naga Hills, to Mr. Reid who was then Chief Secretary. In that letter it was made quite clear that the balance of opinion was against Colonel Loch in his attitude and this local opinion was fully supported by the General. Viewing it all at a much later date (1921) Mr. Reid expressed the opinion that Chinglong turned out as it did "simply because the Commandant ~~next~~ in charge, a senior officer with a distinguished record but who had for years had nothing to do with our little trans-frontier shows refused to go on without reinforcements though his force was more than strong enough to smash the opposition." A punitive expedition was at once organised under

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\*Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, Jan. 1913, Nos.1-39-

Pol, A, Mar. 1913, Nos. 9-77.

Pol., A, Aug. 1913, Nos 16-70.

Assam Secretariat, Pol. A, February 1923, Nos.1-53.

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Major Wilson's command, the original force being augmented by 2 companies of the 1/8th Gurkhas. The Base Camp was located at Wakching. The operations were completely successful, the rifles were recovered, and the guilty villagers were severely punished. The six villages were completely destroyed between 10th and 19th March and at least 120 Naga killed, their losses in men, guns and livestock being described in the official report as very heavy" As a consequence a post was established at Wakching. Captain Hardcastle, I.A., Naga Hills Military Police, and Captains Kernahan, Orchard and Giffard took part in this expedition.

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Webster's comprehensive report on this "T-nas-Dikhu Tou" among what are now called the Konyaks. No.250-G., dated the 25th April 1913, is well worth reading, especially the paragraph on their relations with the British.

IV. The expansion of the control area after 1913.- The Chief Commissioner (Sir Archdale Earle), in reporting the Chinglong incident of 1913 to the Government of India in his letter No. 2717-P., dated the 5th June 1913, concluded his report with a warning regarding a very much wider question, viz., that he would probably have to send up further proposals regarding an extension of our area of control. He reminded the Central Government of how the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government had sent up such proposals in 1906; how they had been first questioned and then accepted by the Government of India; and how they were finally negatived by Lord Morley, the Secretary of State. If they had been accepted, he thought, the events at Chinglong might never have happened.

In September of that year the Chief Commissioner received proposals from the Commissioner for the inclusion in a Political control Area of villages to the south of the Tizu river, Karami (Larumi), Phozami (Yisi), Pütsimi (Pur), Lapvomi (Lephomi), as well as Melomi and P-imi on the North.

Our responsibilities for Melomi and P-imi dated from 1910, when at the time of the Aishan Kuki Expedition they had been assured by Colonel Woods, the Deputy Commissioner with the approval of <sup>the Commissioner that they had been annexed,</sup> ~~discovered~~. The guard at Melomi was withdrawn in March 1912, but Mr. Webster, the Deputy Commissioner, writing in August of that year was uneasy about the situation as regards Kuki activity and asked how far he might go in assuring Melomi and P-imi against Kuki aggression. Sir, Archdale Earle considered that we could not abandon them now, and the Government of India had been addressed in Assam letter No.2931-P., dated the 13th June 1913 with the request that they might be assured of protection, and taken within the boundary of the district.

\*Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, August 1913, Nos. 16-70.  
+Assam Secretariat, Pol., A, July 1913 Nos. 67-73.

an assurance  
which the Eastern  
Bengal and Assam  
Govt. neither approved  
nor )

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After holding a conference\* at Kohima on the 10th November 1913, Sir Archdale decided to approach the Government of India once more. The outcome was a long letter No. 1544-P., dated the 3rd April 1914 in which that Government were asked if they were prepared again to address the Secretary of State. If referred to the previous correspondence contained in Eastern Bengal and Assam letter, No. 6119-J., dated the 7th June 1906, 5204-J., dated the 7th December 1907 and 2450, dated the 18th May 1908. It stated that the Chief Commissioner had reached the irresistible conclusion that we must extend our control. It recounted the "melancholy record\* of outrages which had occurred since ~~1908~~<sup>1908</sup>, the dated of the Secretary of State's last orders, outrages in which our officers had perforce no power to interfere; gave a history of events on the Naga Hills border since the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government had last addressed the Central Government and affirmed that if the Secretary of State had accepted the previous proposals, none of the expeditions undertaken since 1909, except perhaps Makware, would have been necessary.

"9. With no desire to criticise the policy of non-interference the Chief Commissioner is forced to the conclusion that, had the proposals of the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam found acceptance with his Majesty's Secretary of State, none of these expeditions, save possibly the one against the village of Makware would have been necessary, for reasons which have been fully explained to the Government of India the expedition against the village of Chinglong was on a larger scale than any of the others and the assistance of regular troops ultimately proved to be necessary. The other expeditions were all conducted by the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills with the aid of the Military Police. The cost was trifling and the results were eminently satisfactory.

Experience has, however, unfortunately proved that these results are only temporary. The inhabitants of a village which has been punished are for some time only too ready to obey orders. The Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, to take a recent instance, has reported that, when he visited the trans-Dikhu

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British villages in December last, he received envoys from Chinglong and the allied villages that were so severely punished in the last expedition, and that their attitude was most friendly. There is another unfortunate, but usually unavoidable, result of such expeditions ~~one~~ it only to frequently becomes an object of attack to its neighbours, and to the punishment meted out but the British Government are added the horrors of organised attack by savage enemies. In March 1913 Chinglong and the other villages that had been punished in the expedition suffered severely from raids; and men from our own trans-Dikhu villages were sentenced by the Deputy Commissioner to long terms of imprisonment for taking part in these. It was largely on account of these considerations that Sir Bampfylee Fuller in 1906 stated that he had but little faith in casual "promenades" or in isolated punitive expeditions, and that he believed that nothing short of direct declaration of continuous intervention would put an end to the raiding of one village upon another. With these views Sir Archdale Earle is in complete accord.

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\*Assam Secretariat. Pol., A, May 1914, Nos. 1-16.

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One effect of the abandonment of the earlier system of promenades is that the Deputy Commissioner, when he crosses the border with an escort, now does so only in order to punish some village or other. This is fully understood by our independent neighbours, and the opportunity of establishing friendly relations with the various communities along our borders no longer present itself.

10- If, then, the Government of India are prepared to support him, the Chief Commissioner would venture to urge a new practically the same proposals that were made by the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam. He would advocate the declaration of an area of Political control beyond the existing border of the Naga Hills District, and the approximate limits of the country affected by the proposals are indicated roughly in the map attached to this letter...



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arise, and if it did, could be,

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dealt with easily and at small expense. To facilitate the touring of the Deputy Commissioner, and to open up and civilise the area of control, the gradual construction of bridle paths would be necessary, but the work would largely be done by the adjoining villages. Ultimately the area would become an ordinary portion of the district and house-tax would be realised. In certain parts this step might be taken almost immediately.

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15. The Chief Commissioner makes no attempt to disguise the fact that his proposals, if accepted, are the step towards the inclusion of a further area under British administration, and that at some future date the process will have to be repeated until the whole of the country between Assam and Burma has been taken over. The inevitableness of his step has been recognised from the beginning by every one, but the Government of India, and his Majesty's Secretary of State have expressly declared that they have no desire to hasten the process. With this policy the Chief Commissioner ventures respectfully to record his entire agreement. He feels strongly that our advance should be gradual and he is confident that, if his proposals are accepted, the advance will be as gradual as may be desired. He thinks it unnecessary to add to all that had been urged so often on the score of humanity, and he trusts that he has succeeded in ~~convincing~~ convincing the Government of India that the present sacrifice of human life can be stopped and peace be established in an extensive area without either difficulty or expense. For many years to come the Naga Hills district will not pay for the cost of its administration if indeed it will ever do so, but the additional revenue, which will ultimately be realised from each fresh area included, will more than counterbalance the additional expenditure involved, In paragraph 17 of Mr. Milne's letter No. 5204-J., dated the 7th December 1907, it was stated that Sir, Lancelot

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Have believed that, when at last the frontier of this province-marched with that of Burma, it might be possible to secure the internal peace of the whole district with a very much smaller force than is now required. Sir, Archdale Earle shares this belief, and sees no reason why ultimately the Naga Hills should require a large garrison than that of the Garo Hills, or why its inhabitants should not become as civilised and law-abiding as those of the Khasi and Jantia Hills. This can never come about so long as raiding and head-hunting in adjoining areas go unchecked".

For one reason and another, of which the war of 1914-18 was not the least important, no orders were passed on these proposals for more than 7 years, though it need hardly be said that the matter was not <sup>lost</sup> sight of in Assam. Thus in December\* 1918, Mr. Barnes, Deputy Commissioner, Naga hills, had asked for sanction to assess Melomi and Pimi to house tax; and the Chief Commissioner (Sir Nicholas Deatson-Bell) then addressed the Government of India on the 4th February 1919, referred to the recent operations against the Ukis and asked that sanction

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Assam Secretariat, Political, A, May 1914, Nos. 1-16.

\*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, February 1923, Nos. 1-53.

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~~the advancement of the district boundary to the Tizu river,~~ the process being completed in 1904. During the whole of this time the policy worked well and gradually extended the influence of Government over the tribes on the immediate frontier until the time was ripe for the extension of the administered area. Meanwhile, however, an unfortunate collision occurred between the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills and the villages of Yachumi beyond the area of the political control, and was reported to the Government of India in the Assam Administration's letter No. 199-Fom.-1866-P., dated the 14th April 1900. Stringent orders were then passed prohibiting tours beyond the area of political control; ~~and when the Eastern Bengal~~ <sup>except</sup> with the previous sanction of the Local Administration; and when the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government in their letters No. 6119-J., dated the 7th June 1906, and No. 5204-J., dated the 7th December 1907, proposed ~~the formation of a new area of political control,~~ the proposals, although approved by the Government of India were vetoed by the Secretary of State.

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In his Despatch No. 128 (Political), dated the 13th November 1903. It may be that the unfavourable impression created by the Yachumi incident was to some extent responsible for his decision, but that incident occurred far beyond the borders of political control, and would not have happened had not the orders of 1884 been entirely disregarded. The restrictions to ~~some extent relaxed by the order contained in the~~

imposed on the exercise of influence beyond the frontier were to some extent relaxed by the order containing in the Government of India's letter No. 2561-E.-B., dated the 11th August 1904, with reference to the village of Mazungzami, admitting the principle that British subjects trading beyond the frontier of the Naga Hills were entitled to protection as long as they kept within the limit of a day's march of the frontier; and the same principle was recognised in the Government of India's telegram No. 3769-E.C., of the 3th October 1905, in connection with an outrage committed by the village of Yachumi. During the years

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should be accorded to the proposals contained in Sir Archdale Egle's letter No. 1544-P., of the 3rd April 1914. Nothing happened for various reasons and again a reminder was sent on the 14th October 1920, reporting fresh outrages. The Government of India were as reluctant as ever to act but made the concession on the 29th March 1921 of leaving the matter for Sir William Morris, who was about to take office as Governor of Assam, to examine.

On the 28th April 1921, Mr. Hutton, who had by now 3 years experience of these Hills, recorded a valuable note giving the history of relations up to then and on the basis of this the Chief Secretary addressed an important semi-official letter No. 5550-A.P., dated the 3rd September 1921, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India to enquire whether some action might not be hoped for. The letter gathers together and reviews the course of policy since 1834, and the main points are contained in the following excerpts:-

"2. Sir William Morris has now studied the correspondence on this long-standing question. The Government of India's letter No. 2739-E., dated the 20th October 1834, sanctioned if it did not actually initiate the policy of political control area beyond the Naga Hills Frontier in preference to promenades and the execution of agreements with tribal chiefs. The restriction was imposed that interference with inter-tribal quarrels should as a rule be limited to those cases where they involved-

- (1) outrages on British subjects,
- (2) violation of the Inner line.
- (3) danger to the interests of people dwelling inside the British borders by reason of the proximity of disturbance outside.

A subsequent letter No. 246-E., of the 3rd February 1836, sanctioned a further control area in the case of the Ao tribe and the majority of the Sema villages west of the Tizu river. This area except for paying no house-tax came to be as obedient to the orders of the Deputy Commissioner as any regularly administered portion of his charge. It was absorbed gradually by

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control sundry trans-frontier expeditions had to be undertaken and the question came up again in the early days of the reconstituted province of Assam. In the Assam Administration's letter No. 2931-P., dated the 13th June 1913, proposals were submitted for special intervention, for the protection and the later absorption in a British territory of the villages of Melomi and Primi; but at the invitation conveyed in Mr. Reynolds's demi-official letter of the 17th July 1913, the general question of the declaration of an area of political control beyond the existing boundary was again raised in Mr. Reid's letter No. 1544-P., dated the 2nd April 1914. Orders have not yet been received on the proposals then submitted, but in my demi-official letter No. 10721-P., of the 11th November 1920 Sir Nicholas Beatson Bell's alternative proposal to which your letter more immediately refers, was put forward.

3. Since the proposals of 1914 were submitted the position as regards this frontier has altered in some important respects. The labour corps which went from the Naga Hills to France during the war was largely recruited from independent trans-frontier Nagas. It followed that our relations with many independent villages became much closer than they had been.

Further the Somra Tract, which immediately adjoins on the south the area now in question, has since been brought under the administration of the Government of Burma, and the first real attempt to administer the Kukis and other hill tribes in the Manipur State has been recently made by the establishment of the sub-divisions in the Manipur Hills under European Officers. Thus the proposed area of control which was flanked on the north by the administered tract to the east of the Dikhu river, added to the Naga Hills district under the orders contained in Mr. Reynolds's letter No. 1730-E.B., dated the 26th October 1909, is now also flanked on the south by the areas fully administered either by the Government of Burma or by the Manipur State. In this way also the relations between administered areas and the tract in question have become more intimate.

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6.....The whole position on the frontier is dominated by the fact that the boundary is a purely arbitrary line. Mr. Nuttall, the present Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills, who has a long and intimate acquaintance with the area, writes—"Villages on either side have land, cattle, cousins and relations-in-law on the other. Feuds, alliances, trade, cultivation—all the interests in life in fact expect the payment of revenue and the freedom to hunt heads, —une counter to the frontier line and not parallel to it. Under these circumstances no one could administer the district without being perpetually brought up against the question of interference beyond the frontier. "In these circumstances we cannot hope to civilise our own half-savage peoples so long as they see raiding and headhunting practised by their brothers and cousins just across the border. In order to complete our mission of civilisation <sup>within</sup> ~~within~~ our own borders we must gradually extend the area which we control. The undertaking has been given in the past, and can be repeated by Sir William Morris, to do this, without asking for our force of Assam Rifles to be increased by a single man, or for our ultimate expenditure on the Naga Hills district to become greater than it is at present save in so far as the claims <sup>of</sup> education and medical facilities render this desirable. This, Sir William Morris thinks does constitute a real and immediate advantage such as is referred to in paragraph 3 of Mr. Cates's letter. Another very real advantage is that as we extend our control the risk that punitive expeditions will be necessary steadily diminished, in as much as complications on this frontier occur not in controlled, but in uncontrolled areas. It is only necessary in this connexion to the fact that throughout the Kuki operations not only the Lushais who are practically ~~of~~ the same race, but the Kukis ~~themselves~~ in the Lushais ~~the~~ Hills and Naga Hills districts stood firm and gave no trouble, but on the contrary in some cases rendered considerable assistance.

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7- After studying the past correspondence and discussing the question with those of his officers who are best acquainted with the conditions, Sir William Marris therefore desired strongly to support the proposal put forward in 1914. He has not the slightest desire to move more rapidly in the direction of the extension of control over this inadministered area than is actually necessary, but he is convinced that the administration of the Naga Hills district and the process of civilisation of its inhabitants are being materially impeded for want of the small advance which was proposed in 1914. He does not think that the alternative course put forward by Sir Nicholas Beatson-Bell, ~~which is to be sanctioned~~ that the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills should be authorised to tour across the frontier as are the Political Officers of the two Frontier Tracts, would suffice. The existing orders on the subject of tours beyond the frontier, whether of the Naga Hills or elsewhere, are those laid down in the Government of the ~~Naga Hills~~ India's letter No. 1046-E.B., dated the 13th May 1900 and provided that no such tour shall be made without previous reference to the Assam Government and that where there is risk of complications such as might render a punitive expedition necessary the tour shall not be sanctioned without the previous approval of the making our influence felt in the area concerned without going beyond these orders, but Sir William Marris feels, as Sir

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Lancelot Hare felt, that it would be better to recognise the situation frankly, and to exercise gradually the same measure of loose political control which since 1911 we have been permitted to exercise through the Political Officer at Sadiya and ~~Ballepatad~~ and which upto 1904 was exercised with good results on the Naga Hills frontier. He can definitely undertake to do nothing which will compel him to apply to the Government of India for assistance from the regular army, and he can undertake also to observe the conditions which govern the undertaking of trans-frontier tours. That is to say, without previous reference to India he will permit no tours which might render the subsequent despatch of punitive expedition necessary.

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8. Whatever orders are passed on the general question of the formation of an area of Political control beyond the borders of the Naga Hills district, I am to urge that the area including the villages of Melomi and ~~P~~imi, which were dealt with in our letter No. 2931-P., dated the 18th June 1913, should be definitely included in British territory without delay.... In its letter No. 2931-P., dated the 18th June 1913, the Assam Administration..... represented that at the time of the Aishan-Kuki expedition in 1910 these villages had been assumed by the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills with the approval of the Commissioner of the Division that they had been annexed. The letter continued; "These orders were neither approved nor disapproved by the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, and the Chief Commissioner feels strongly that to follow the letter course after the lapse of a further period of eight years, especially in view of the course which events have meanwhile taken..... A reversion to the policy of an area occupied and administered since 1913, in which every existing village has applied for permanent and complete annexation and which is already regarded by independent tribes as a part of British territory, and the abandonment of villages which have been protected since the Aishan-Kuki expedition eleven years ago. It is unnecessary to enlarge on the disastrous consequences of such a step among the frontier inevitably leading to serious trouble in the near future, it would also be unfair to the Burma Government to allow an administered tract to relapse into an Alsatia for Kuki head hunters desirous of escaping from their control in the Soma tract or from the Manipur State. Incidentally, though this is of minor importance, the abandonment of this area would entail the relinquishment of 50 miles of completed bridle paths and bridges and the exchange for an irregular frontier of eighty miles of a line only 54 miles long most of which is defined by a broad and swifted river entirely unfordable in the rains and only fordable in places for the remaining six months of the year..... The area which it is now proposed to include in the Naga Hills District covers more than the two villages which it was proposed to annex in

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1913. This, however, is owing to the change in the situation caused by the administration of the Somra tract and the enforced occupation of this area during the Kuki rising.

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Much hesitation and reluctance had to be overcome, and it was not until the end of 1922 that the Government of India felt that they were prepared to recommend the proposals of the Assam Government to the following effect:-

" It will be seen that the measures advocated by the Assam Government are:-

- (a) The inclusion in British territory of the villages of Melomi and Pimi with the area surrounding them, and
- (b) An extension of the area in Chief Political control is exercised by the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills District beyond the present frontier of the district

The areas affected by these two recommendations are shown in the map which accompanies this despatch. In effect the Assam Government strongly advocate the same measures which were urged upon our attention by the Assam Administration in Mr. Reid's letter No. 1544-P., dated the 2nd April 1914, a copy of which formed the second enclosure to the despatch from Lord Chelmsford's Government, No. 116-External, dated the 16th February 1917.

3. These proposals embodying the considered views of the Local Government and the Local officers, who have for many years advocated the policy which we now support, are substantially the same as those advanced by Lord Minto's Government in their despatch No. 132-External, dated the 16th July 1903. They were, however, rejected by Lord Morley in his Political despatch No. 128, dated the 13th November of the same year.

4. We are now satisfied that a decision might with advantage be reconsidered. The steps proposed are called for on humanitarian grounds and will be justified further by the beneficial effect which we expect them to have upon our own border villages. They involve no strategic danger, and no movement of troops, and we do not anticipate that they will lead to any change upon central revenues or to any appreciable increase of expenditure defrayed

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from normal provincial revenue.

5. We, therefore, identify ourselves with the views expressed by the Assam Government and as regards the Melomi and Primi tract ask your authority to regularise the existing position by definitely including the area shown in yellow on the map within British territory. With reference to the second proposal it will be seen that the outer boundary of the area within which political control is to be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills District, has only been roughly indicated on the map; It is impossible until the country has been visited and surveyed to give more definite boundaries. We request you permission, therefore, to approve the proposed extension in principle and to authorise the Local Government to direct the Deputy Commissioner of the district to march through the area with a suitable escort and then to submit definite proposals for a boundary based on a line beyond which it will not be necessary to extend control for several years to come".

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In their letter No. 1327-534-Est., dated the 23rd December 1922, the Government of India informed Assam that the Secretary of State had agreed (in his telegram No. 4901, dated the 19th December 1922) to include Melomi and Primi and had accepted in principle the proposals regarding a Political control area.

Melomi and Primi\* were formally included in the district and assessed to revenue in the year 1922-23.

The final demarcation of the boundaries which had to be made in consonance with the decision of the Secretary of State was based on Dr. Hutton's report No. 377-G., + dated the 9th May 1923 after a tour in the area east of Tamlu and between the Yangyu river and Patkoi Range supplemented by a further report No. 2168-G., dated 30th November 1923. During these tours powerful villages were visited which had never even heard of the plains of Assam or had seen an European. The colour of Europeans was looked at with great distaste and they were considered "unripe". Dr. Hutton

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tried the bold experiment of attempting to induce these entirely savage villages to carry the loads of the expedition when required. He was successful, though often only after much parley. There were some critical moments, but not a shot was fired by the escort.

Proposals for demarcation sent up in Assam letter No. 1463-5176-A.P., dated the 17th September 1924 were accepted by the Secretary of State in March 1925 and a comprehensive revised notification covering all the boundaries of the Naga Hills District was issued on the 25th November 1925, No. 3102-D.

In January 1927 the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, forwarded a proposal from the sub-Divisional Officer, Mokokchung to, include within the administered area 6 villages on the east and south-east of Mokokchung. It was to cast nothing, simplify the boundary and the villages wanted it. Government supported the proposal and the Secretary of State's sanction was communicated in Government of India's No. 597-x., dated the 13th October 1927, and the changes were published in Notification No. 6492-A.P., dated the 23rd November 1927.

Mr. Mills' report on the system for the year 1924-25 was to the effect that "It has worked well and has made it easier to deal promptly and firmly with trans-frontier villages".

A description of this system as it eventually developed, though it should be premised that it has not worked, and does not work, always "according to plan", is to be found in a note\* recorded by Mr. Mills in 1937 of which the following are extracts:-

"4.....Under this system a strip of territory was placed under loose control between the fully administered area and the entirely uncontrolled Tribal Area.

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\*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1926, Nos. 22-96.

+Annual Administration Report for 1922-23.

+Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1925, Nos. 48-126.

(Assam Secretariat, Political, A, March 1929, Nos. 219-267.

)Assam Secretariat, Tribal, B, September 1938, Nos. 1-9.

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(1) The area selected was not too large, and was confined as far as possible to country of which we already had fairly detailed knowledge.

(2) Much of the Konyak area to the North was deliberately omitted; the powerful hereditary chiefs there control groups of villages; they are fully capable of managing their own affairs; and if control is over-decided upon in the future it may well be that a scheme for establishing a number of small States may have to be considered.

(3) Tribal boundaries were as far as possible selected as our boundaries, rather than natural features, however geographically convenient, which intersected tribes.

5. No taxes are levied in the Control Area, which is not administered in any sense of the word and does not form part of the Province of Assam. Though under loose control it remains part of the Tribal Area.

On the other hand the Deputy Commissioner is always ready to arbitrate in disputes in the Control Area, first obtaining, whenever possible a previous assurance that the parties will accept his arbitration.

6..... As time goes on the villages bordering the frontier of the fully administered area become so accustomed to bringing their troubles and disputes to the Deputy Commissioner that there are now considerable stretches of the control Area where war is obsolete as a means of settling differences, (head-hunting' has died a natural death, and the villages are as amenable to orders as any in the fully administered area.....

\* \* \* \* \*

8. In the Assam Naga Hills Control Area there is no general order prohibiting war with its inevitable concomitant of headtaking. All know that serious and treacherous massacres meet with retribution, and particular wars are sometimes specifically prohibited. For instance a war is prohibited if there is a risk of raiders crossing our boundary into administered

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territory in their attempts to outflank each other, or of fugitives being followed in hot pursuit across our border. Or again a weak village which is never likely to attack anyone may be given protection by specific orders. Or yet again war may break out between two villages so near to one another that normal work in the fields is hampered and famine threatens both and then the elders of both sides may come in and make it quite clear that their hothead are out of control and that they would welcome orders which would put an end to the inconvenient feud without loss of honour to either side.

General orders stopping war would be impossible to enforce without constant punitive expeditions, a remedy which might well be worse for the villagers than the disease. Even a suggestion that war in general is prohibited has been found to lead to most unfortunate results. A few villages are sure to let

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their defences fall into disrepair and to lose their alertness. Then a sudden raid by a watchful neighbour results in massacre, no punishment of which can bring the dead back to life. On the other hand a properly defended, alert Naga village is practically impregnable against Naga weapons, and attacks against such villages are rarely made and are infinitely more rarely successful. This in itself makes for peace. In normal circumstances raiders' victims are almost always stragglers and the wariness of the Naga makes their number extremely small.

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10.....By far the most important part of the Deputy Commissioner's staff, on whom the whole efficiency of his administration depends is picked body of Naga interpreters, drawn from the various tribes in such a way that a man is always dealt with by one of his own tribe, The functions of the interpreters extends far beyond anything that their name implies. They arrest offenders, advise the Deputy Commissioner on intricate questions of custom, and themselves settle a very large number of petty disputes. They

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Wear tribal dress and remain Nagas in every way. In selecting them, though a few can read and write, education is not considered, but family character and influence are regarded as of supreme importance. Their prestige is great.

The relevance for this note of this description of the method of Government through picked interpreters lies in the fact that it extends into the Control Area. Some of the interpreters come from villages just on our side of the border and have influence across the border, while others actually have their homes in the Control Area itself. They act as liaison officials between the Deputy Commissioner and villages in the Control Area.

11. A part from the constant stream of information reaching him through his interpreters direct knowledge of events in the Control Area is gained but the Deputy Commissioner in two ways. Firstly he makes occasional friendly tours (say once in two years) in some portion of it. Secondly, he receives frequent visits from the leading men of smooths the way for yet another more extended tour, and a thorough prior knowledge of politics in the Control Area frustrates the common Naga trick by which a village will receive a column with the utmost friendliness and then by false tales egg on their enemies beyond to attack it, simply for the pleasure of witnessing the inevitable heavy defeat of the said enemies.....

In 1925-26\* by letter Pol. 1902.5225-A.P., dated the 28th October 1925, the conduct of relations with the independent Nagas bordering on that District was transferred from the Deputy Commissioner ~~xxxxxx District~~ of Sibsagar to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Mokokchung, and the latter took over relations with the Area between the Taukok and Delhi Rivers.

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\*Assam Administration Report for Naga Hills for 1925-26.

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In 1926-27\* the question of guns among Konyak villages came under scrutiny, owing to the great increase in the numbers of these weapons, and in consequence Totok was ordered to use only spears and ~~axes~~ daos in their inter-village wars. This policy has been followed since though not without difficulty. It was emphasised in 1939 when the Governor held a Durbar at Watching on January 13th and ordered the surrender, as fines for misbehaviour in this way, of 300 guns from Aopao, Longmien, Chingha, Lungha, Chin and Totk Chongkho. They were all surrendered within a week.

In letter No. Po; 1483-2398-A.P., + of the 20th July 1931, Sir Laurie Hammond reiterated the policy of minimum interference in quarrels between controlled and tribal villages. The occasion for this was a reference made by the Deputy Commissioner Mr. Mills, in which he stated his own views as to the policy thus:

".....Lately our intervention in quarrels in the Control Area has become more and more <sup>automatic</sup> ~~authoritative~~, it is easy, I admit, to say "stop" give a hint about Assam Rifles, and proceed to calculate how many mithan ought to be levied for each life lost. But I am convinced that such a remedy is only a palliative for quarrels, and a bad one in every way. People in our Control Area are lulled into a sense of false security and villages are unfortified. A surprise raid is easy. A penalty in mithan is paid, and things quite down till there is another surprise raid.

Compensation from the fine is practically always refused by the aggrieved village. They do not consider that mithan can pay for the lives of their men and frankly settle down to wait till they get heads in exchange.

If we let it be distinctly understood, as we did till very recently that we reserve to ourselves the right to intervene, when we see fit, but do not guarantee to prevent all wars, trans-frontier villages would live more warily, and lives would rarely be lost, for the Naga depends entirely on surprise and never

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attacks an enemy who is ready for him. (I believe in a war which lasted 16 years between the big Konyak villages of Tamlu and Namsang the total casualties were 4). Instead therefore of invariably punishing (but not hanging) the culprits I feel it is often time. I have usually found that the day soon comes when both sides have had enough, not of slaughter, for the number of lives lost is negligible, but of living in a state of nervous tension. Settlement is then easy."

The Assam Government's reply was to the effect that :-

"..... the Governor-in-Council considers that the policy suggested by the Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, in his letter No. 1074-G. dated the 20th June 1931, is in consonance with that suggested by the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Ward and

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Assam Administration Report from Naga Hills for 1925-26.

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approved by the Government of India, viz., that Government should not interfere in disputes between tribes residing within and those residing outside the area to control, even though murder has resulted. In this connection a reference is invited to the correspondence ending with the Assam Administration's letter No. 494, dated the 9th March 1886, to the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills.

If of course the 'war' cannot be localised then it may be necessary to use the Assam Rifles or for the Deputy Commissioner Naga Hills to tour during the cold weather and administer communal punishment, but the Governor-in-Council considers that it is best as far as possible to avoid interfering."

V. 1914-1923- Other Events-the Great War of 1914-1918.-In January 1917\* the Secretary of State enquired of the Assam Administration whether they could assist in raising the 50,000 men who were wanted as labourers in France. Assam said they could produce 8,000 men and this offer was gladly accepted. The intention was to find 2,000 men each from the Lushai Hills, Manipur,

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THE Naga hills and the Khasi and Garo Hills combined. A spokesman on behalf of the Government of India describes Assam's offer as the biggest, most definite and most practical one that had reached them. The proposal that house tax should be remitted to all who volunteered was accepted by the Government of India.

On 9th March 1917 orders were issued to raise No. 21 (Naga Hills) and 22 (Maniour) Corps. All the Jhotas and the majority of the Sama ~~made~~ a good response, the latter sending 1,000 men. The Aos sent men too, if a little slowly. Angamis, Kacha Nagas and Kukis would not volunteer who came in from ~~the~~ across the Frontier. The Corps was composed of :-

Sema	...	...	...	...	1,000
Jhotas	...	...	...	...	400
Rengmas	...	...	...	...	200
Changs and other Trans-frontier tribes	...	...	...	...	200
Aos	...	...	...	...	200
					2,000

The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. H.C. Barnes went in command with a number of clerks and Dobashis.

In December 1917 protests were raised against enlistment for the duration which had been laid down but the question was finally decided by the War Office, who said that men were not wanted unless they undertook to enlist for the duration, and order followed in January 1918 to the effect that all who would not enroll for the period of the war were to be discharged. One result of this was that a draft of 817 Naga Hills recruits which was waiting

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\*Assam Secretariat, Political, A, December 1917, Nos. 39-80.

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to go to France was directed to the Kuki operations in January 1918. This draft consisted of-

60 lhotas.

90 Semas.

120 Aos

60 Kukis and Kacha Nagas.

480 Angamis.

There was a Naga Labour Corps numbered 35 and another numbered 38 which both arrived home in about June 1918. The money they brought home was soon spent. Semas paid their debts. Lhotas purchased land. The smiths of Wanching and Wakching and the ornament-makers of Seromi made fortunes. And prices soared. Mr. Hutton says that the men came back greatly impressed with the might of the Saker.

The response to the War Loan was, considering the poverty of the Hills, remarkable Rs.26,264 was subscribed to the War Loan during 1917-18 and Rs.39,000 was subscribed to the 2nd Indian War Loan in 1918-19.

The Somra Tract and the "Cross-hatched" Area.- In a letter\* dated the 11th September 1915, Burma made the proposal that the Somra Tract should be brought under administration and included in Burma. In 1908 and again 1911 and 1912 they had considered the matter but decided against such action, mainly because the Tract was giving no trouble and because the Chief Konyak kept a good control over his Kukis in that area. Koryang, however, was not dead and there was no hope of peace.

This Tract was described by the Commissioner of the Sagaing Division as covering an area of 800 square miles inhabited by Kukis and Tangkul Nagas. The latter were unarmed and were concentrated in the north-west corner of the Tract in 11 villages numbering 1,002 houses. They were anxious to be administered and to be saved from that which was described as the danger of "wholesale slaughter" by the Kukis. The Kukis, who were immigrants of the Manipur state lived in the eastern and southern part of the tract and had numerous guns in their possession.

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ported the results of the expedition in his letter (G(TD), dated 25th January 1917, thus-

"3. From the time we left the Naga Hills district until we reached the area under the control of Yansa (Jaboka) it was evident that we were unwelcome visitors; unwelcome owing to the inability of the Chiefs of Hangyu to believe the assurance that neither punishment nor the annexation of their land was contemplated. Their fears were natural since for many years the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills has not been permitted by Government to cross the border except to punish or annex. This tour may it is to be hoped, lead to a revival of those friendly tours in the unadministered tracts, which were in the past productive of so much good. Zunyu and Longhong their villages by making difficulties about showing the village water supply. In Yansa and in the Chonyu group we were well received. I attribute the absence of resistance to our movements to the careful arrangements of Major

Abuthnot, in camp and on the march, to make a surprise attack impossible or unlikely to succeed, to the size of the escort and to the fact that the force had its own coolies. Obstruction appearing ~~on the march~~ unprofitable to the Nagas, the opportunity of gradually getting on better terms with them naturally resulted and was utilized. Mr. Hutton was in charge of the organization and arrangement of the Sema coolies corps and its rations, a task demanding an unusual amount of forethought and attention to detail. It would be difficult to speak too highly of the manner in which he carried out his duties.

\* Political, A, May 1916 Nos. 15-37.

- + 1. Assam Secretariat, Political A, June 1922, Nos. 3-6
- 2. Political, A. December 1923, Nos. 1-17.

*endeavour without success to celebrate our passage through*

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4. The enquiry into the claims to rights over the land transferred to Sibsaga- began at Longhong and was continued at Zusa, Chopnyu and Chepsa and concluded at Nokphang. Colonel Playfair and I were in agreement on all points. And the decisions arrived at represent our joint decisions. These were accepted by the headmen of the villages concerned..... the whole matter will be settled on a payment of Rs. 1,500, all the land included in the Sibsaga- district to be entirely given up to Government, except that Zusa will have the right to Jhum on the Tanglam range, though not in the plains to the north of it. The claimants are to come to Sonari on January 25th, to receive payment from me. It is quite evident that the Chopnyu group has not the slightest wish to quarrel with Government. They naturally looked with apprehension and distrust on the loss of their land. Any Naga hates losing his land, even if his claim to it is somewhat shadowy."

In Assam Government letter No. 1584-P, dated 19th February 1917, it was stated.

"-----The Chief Commissioner, approves of the arrangement under which a satisfactory solution has been arrived at on payment of a compensation of Rs. 1,500 to the Naga Chiefs. All the land included in the Sibsaga- district will now be entirely at the disposal of the Government with the exception that the village of Zusa will have the right to Jhum on the Tanglam range, though not in the plains to the north of it."

The Kuki Rebellion of 1917-19.- Though in the earlier days of the Kuki rebellion of 1917-19 in Manipur there was a great deal of alarm and unrest among the Angamis and Kacha Nagas in the Naga Hills, the Kukis within the district remained loyal. Dr. Hutton, the then Deputy Commissioner, conducted two important and successful expeditions against Kukis who were troubling his border. The first was between January and March 1918 in the neighbourhood of Henima in the south-west of the Naga Hills District. The Commissioner spoke in the highest terms of the way in which these operations were carried out and stated that Dr. Hutton had thereby kept the peace in the Naga Hills and taught the Kukis a lesson. In his report the Deputy Commissioner expressed himself

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in uncompromising terms on the origin of the trouble, viz., that the Manipur lamhus were solely responsible and that the gross corruption at Imphal largely contributed to it. This was followed by an expedition in April 1918 to the area lying between the Somra Tract on the south and the Tizu on the north, to take action against Kukis who had come in there and were oppressing the local Nagas in their customary way. They were settled near Lapvomi and were harassing it and neighbouring villages such as Phozami and Primi. His operations were entirely ~~unsuccessful~~ successful and he had only one casualty, a sepoy killed. In his report he expressed the hope that the effect would be to make this "set of robbers clear out of the Naga Hills District and go off into the "Cross-hatched area" or into Burma. He proposed that posts of one Indian Officer and 50 men each should be placed at Lopvomi and Yangnoi to guard against the return of

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Assam Secretariat, Political, B, April 1917, Nos. 13-69.

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the Kukis. Government agreed to his proposal, subject to any arrangements which might arise out of the large Kuki operations which were to take place in the following cold weather of 1918-19.

Their operations of course affected conditions in the Naga Hills and posts had to be established on the border of, and in, Manipur to check the movements of the hostile Kukis. They were recognised as part of the Great War and the General Service Medal was given to those who took part in them. One or two points are worthy of mention. The Kukis not only possessed large numbers of muzzle loading guns, but made leather cannon which were far from ineffective at short range. Of the muzzle loading guns, which included many Tower Muskets in excellent condition, the most valued were flintlocks since the Kukis could make their own gunpowder but were cut off from all supplies of percussion caps. Our columns



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pointed out that Government under the terms of the orders of 1921 was making a fixed annual payment for a village called Bhitam which actually was outside the Inner Line and was in fact uncultivated and therefore producing no revenue. The remedy was to include the area within British Territory so that it might be resettled and recultivated. This was done.

In February 1923\* four men of the Konyak village of Yungya wounded a man of Kamahu, and pursued him on to and killed him on British soil. Mr. Hutton the Deputy Commissioner visited Yungya in March and burnt the "Morungs" of the two hostile clans to whom the guilty men belonged. They did ~~not~~ however, give up the culprit. In the mean while information had been received that Tansa might on our boundary and in the Control Area had brought from these same two clans aslave girls whom they beheaded. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Mr. Mills, then went there in August and succeeded in securing the four wanted men and also fined Tansa for their delinquency.

Vl. Jadonang and Gaidiliu 1931-1941.- In 1931 reports were received of a serious movement initiated by one Jadonang who set himself up in Kambion in Manipur as a "Messiah-King" of the Kabui and Kacha Nagas. In reporting in February of that year to the Government of India on the considerable unrest which existed among the Kabui Nagas in the north-west hills of the Manipur State, the Assam Administration stated.....

3. A Kabui Naga named Jadonang (living at a village Kambion on the Cachar-Imphal bridle path) has proclaimed a Kabui Naga Raj. He is supposed to have powers of a sorcerer, and the Kacha Nagas, believing that he is the "Messiah" for whom they have been waiting, have sent him as tribute large numbers of mithuns and the semidomesticated gayals which are a sign of wealth among some of the Assam hill tribes and used for marriage gifts. etc.

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Large assemblies of Nagas ~~xxx~~ have been held at a village marked Nankhai where Jadonang has been treated as a God. The Kukis, who during the Kuki rebellion in 1918 cut up many villages of the Kabui Nagas are afraid of reprisals and some of them have already come into Imphal for safety. According to the Kukis, Jadonang is collecting funds ~~xxx~~ with the intention of attacking them. The Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, also has received information that Jadonang has given out that revenue may be paid this year but is to be paid to him in 1931-32.

The Political Agent in Manipur sent out a State official ~~to arrest~~ Jadonang, but on news being received that the latter had gone to Cachar with some followers, he wired to the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar, to arrest him and news has now been received that Jadonang has been ~~arrested~~ in Cachar under section 108, Criminal Procedure Code. ~~He~~ is being taken back to Manipur under an extradition warrant".

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\* Political, B, March 1923, Nos. 178-188.

+ Political, B, December 1923, Nos. 216-240.

+ Assam Secretariat, Political, A, September 1931, Nos. 20-94.

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The Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills reported more fully on 16th March as follows:-

Jadonang's claim was as follows:- His day and that of the Kabuis and Kacha Nagas had come at last. In three years all would be fulfilled. He know by his miraculous powers that during the Kuki rebelled. ~~He~~ know by his miraculous powers that during the Kuki rebellion the Kukis captured two Naga girls, and brutally murdered one and buried the other alive. Therefore the Kukis were to be exterminated within the three years. Nagas were not to strike the first blow, but were to be absolutely ready. The first act of aggression by any Kukis was to ~~be~~ a signal for a general attack on them, and each Naga village, was to massacre all Kukis within reach. This was to be kept an absolute ~~secret~~ from Government

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and the Kukis, and any one who revealed it would die.

Jadonang's claim appears to be connected with the old Naga tradition of a Messiah King to which Dr. Hutton refers on page 252 of his 'Angami Naga'. There is no evidence, however, that the Angamis are involved in the present trouble. On the contrary, Jadonang has expressed his dislike of them, clearly regarding them as oppressive overlords of the Kacha Nagas nad Kabuis.

His claims as a healer were probably only a bait to attract adherents, as invalids who went with the humble offering of a rupee were told that not much could be done for them, but that their village ought to send in some substantial tribute in the form of a mithun. He is universally spoken of as 'the King' or 'the spirit King'.

By this story of the torture of Naga girls Jadonang worked the Kacha Nagas of my district in a great state of excitement, and any incident between Kukis and Nagas, such as is always liable to occur somewhere in such a large area, would certainly have shed deplorable results. The detachment reached Henima in time, however and there was no disturbance.

On March 1st, Mr. Higgins, Political Agent, Manipur, visited Kambion (Jadonang had already been arrested on 19th February). He describes Jadonang's home and temple as follows:-

"While Camp was being made, we went into the village, and visited Jadonag's house and temples. The house is of the ordinary Kabui type but is an ahongyum (ornamented house). The front is of wooden planks, painted white, with scrolls, patterns, and pictures of men, mithuns, elephants, tortoises, etc., in black. In front, ~~of the house~~ ~~the~~ the sacrificial posts of thirty mithuns each one an upright post stuck in the ground, with two posts in front, in the form of a St. Andrew's cross. On each side of the door were white slaps of wood, in red paint. In the back room of the house was a broad clay pedestal, supporting a large flat circular stone, about four feet in diameter, approached by clay steps. We were told that Jadonang used to pray on this slab. Next to the house was a temple, built on high wooden piles, and entered by steps cut in a long log. The temple was building

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of bamboo matting thatched, with a small verandah in front and behind. It consisted of one long room with bamboo branched the whole length of each side wall. From a cross beam in the

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middle hung an oil lamp. At the far end was a bamboo platform, with a railing round three sides, and a flight of steps on the fourth side. Facing the platform were four wooden chairs, on each of which was a white felt hat. We were told that it was Jadamang's custom to preach from the platform, while the elders of the village sat in the chairs, wearing the hats, and the lesser lights occupied the benches. Beside the platform was a perambulator, and a zinc bath-tub, for the use of Jadamang's son. Higher up the village was a second temple, recently constructed. In design it was similar to the first, except that there was a long narrow room on each side, parallel to the long central room. The central room contained benches, similar to those in the old temple. In place of the pulpit was a shrine, approached by a flight of steps, ornamented in black and white. At the top of the steps was a door, behind which was a red curtain, covering the opening of the shrine. Inside the shrine were clay figures of a Naga man and woman, dressed in festive clothes, and a clay mithun. In front of them were five black stones, and Re. 1-9-6 in small coins mostly pice. On the top of the shrine was a platform, approached by a second flight of steps, on which was a chair. Just above the chair was a python curled up on the ridge pole of the roof. In front of the shrine was a sacrificial clock, made out of a log, at which goats were sacrificed. The floor of a round was plentifully sprinkled with blood some of which was fresh. I shot the python and told the village elders the temples must be demolished. Their demolition, as the elders themselves admitted, involves no interference with the animistic religion of these people, as it is not their custom to have temples for their gods. These temples appear to have originated in the brain of Jadamang, and to have been constructed for his

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personal aggrandisement, not to say profit, for he reaped a rich harvest of offerings, in animals and money, from dupes who came to worship him and his gods therein.

The two side rooms were his retiring rooms, each fitted with a bamboo bed and a hearth. The elders said that he used to sleep in them sometimes, always with his first wife (he has two).

Near Jadonang's house were two large buildings called kitchens. The elders said they were used as hostels and the smaller rooms therein were used as bath rooms by persons bringing offerings, who are not permitted to enter the upper temple until they had bathed".

On March 13th he visited Nugkao where Gaidiliu was established. He described her as a "rather sultry little unmarried girl" of 17".

On 16th May 1931, the Assam Government were able to report that-----

"3. Normal conditions now prevail again and the idea of a Naga raj has been dissipated. Jadonang, the instigator of all the troubles, is now under trial in the court of the political Agent in Manipur, with a number of men of Kambiron and neighbouring villages, for the murder of four Manipuri traders who disappeared about March 1930. It is understood that there is evidence to

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to implicate him as one of the principals. If he is acquitted in the murder case the question of his internment as a State prisoner under regulation 111 of 1918 will be considered".

Jadonang was tried in Manipur of a charge of murder and sentenced to death on 13th June 1931. The murder had taken place in March 1930 at Kambiron when 4 Manipuris were set upon by the mob at Jadonang's instigation and with his participation and done to death. His companion Gaidiliu who was regarded as his spiritual successor, if not incarnation, carried on his work. She was "wanted" on a charge of murder but she was not to be captured till October 1932, and as the agitation was centered in three administrations, the Naga Hills, the North Cachar Hills and Manipur, with every man and woman in the effected villages an active sympathiser, operations were made very diffi-

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cult. In a note recorded on 19th June 1932, Mr. Mills, Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, stated his views thus:

"The real danger of the movement is the spirit of defiance now abroad. Naha who are ordinarily truthful and friendly, have been taught that officials are to be believed to be deprived of information. These lessons will not quickly be forgotten.

The capture of Gaidiliu will not end the agitation. There is a want for murder out against her and she can be dealt with when caught. She will be succeeded by one or more "mediums". To be a "medium" is not an offence under any law. Yet they will continue to keep the people in a state of constant excitement, and Nagas will continue to be set over against Government and Kukis. The result from the administrative point of view will be serious. Our first object is the capture of Gaidiliu. Once she is in our hands we must aim at gradually suppressing the movement by punishment, persuasion and personal influence, This will be a long task".

On 20th February 1932+ the Assam Government reported the revival of the unrest among the Kabui Nagas to the Government of India in their letter No. Pol., -471/1645-A.P.

"Jadonang, who claiming to be their Messiah King was responsible for the trouble that occurred last year, was convicted and hanged for murder, and it was thought that the unrest would then cease. Unfortunately the woman Gaidiliu, who was associated with Jadonang as a priestess, reappeared among these people, apparently with some man impersonating Jadonang, who was said to have come to life again.....The arrival of the Deputy Commissioner with a detachment of Assam rifles at Henima led to the flight of the woman and her party, but she had already established the belief that it was to him the Kabui Nagas owed allegiance, The fear of an attack on the Kukis has for the moment been dispelled by presence of the Assam rifles, but it will clearly take time to undo the mischief which has been cleverly engineered by the

\*Assam Secretariat, Political, B, September 1931, Nos. 422-447.  
+Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1933, Nos. 59-315.  
+Assam Secretariat, Political, A, June 1933, Nos. 59-315.

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Impostors. Every attempt is being made to capture the woman Gaidiliu who has escaped, apparently with a large escort, into the North Cachar Hills. Detachments of Assam Rifles are pursuing her and her party. One section came in contact with them on the 16th instant, but they managed to escape after opening fire on the section\*.

Soon after this a further report dated the 2nd March 1932 stated.-

"2. The cult which Gaidiliu has revived has clearly spread over a large area of the Naga Hills, Manipur and the North Cachar Hills and unless Gaidiliu and her party can be captured, there is grave danger of a serious outbreak. The Governor-in-Council had therefore sanctioned organized operations to round up Gaidiliu and her party. The Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, has been placed in control with authority to draw on the 3rd and 4th Battalions of the Assam Rifles for such men as he may need. The Sub-Divisional Officer, North Cachar Hills, and an officer in Manipur have been directed to co-operate as his assistants".

Long and difficult operations followed in the attempt to arrest this girl. In March 1932 a detachment of Assam Rifles, when close on her heels, were attacked at Hangrum by a large body of Nagas and had to fire on them; and in the same month the Kachax Naga village of Bopungwemi in the Naga Hills District had to be burnt. At last, on the 17th October 1932 Gaidiliu was captured at Pulomi in the Naga Hills by Captain N. Macdonald, Commandant of the Assam Rifles. Mr. Mills describes her final movements thus:-

"..... Gaidiliu was at Pulomi for about ten days before she was captured. She was clearly desperate, for she was at the end of the Kachax Naga country and had nowhere to go. She said openly that in the next ~~tho~~ months either she or Government would win. All she could do was to stage a theatrical last stand. Apparently she hoped that an "army" would collect round her. Meanwhile she made Pulomi build an amazing palisade. It was copied from the palisade of the post at Hangrum, even down to a fault which had been criticised by the commandant there. It ran all the way round the village except where the ground is precipitous, and to make it, Pulomi worked like slaves and

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destroyed a great deal of their valuable firewood reserve to provide the thousands of tree trunks required. Four thousand men with rifles behind it would have been formidable, but a few hundred Nagas inside it could neither have thrown a spear over it nor wielded a dao, it had not been quite completed when she was captured. Her orders on what was to be done when an attacking force came were remarkable. She would strike the Sahibs dead with magic and her supporters were then to use daos only, for they would be enough. When Captain Macdonald made his attack at dawn they melted away and there was no magic. Pulomi shouted and brandished daos according to her orders, but were careful not to go beyond them. No bow was struck and the village was clearly relieved when sepoy ignominiously hauled out of a house the biting, scratching girl for whom they had uselessly worked so hard and killed so many cattle

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\* Political, A, June 1933, Nos. 59-315.

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though any mistake on the part of the Commandant would probably have led to an attack in desperation by her supporters. With her were captured her young nephew, the Kambion boy, as Bopungwent boy, two Lalongmi men and a Hangum man. The rest of her escort escaped but she gave the names of all but four later. The young nephew presents a problem, for he is obviously regarded as important and if he is released the mantle of Gaidiliu may fall on him.

Captain Macdonald's dispositions received the commendation of the Assam Government in their letter No. Pol.-283-1751-A.P., dated the 28th February 1833 thus:-

"Captain Macdonald on receipt of information regarding the whereabouts of this Naga woman led a column of the Assam rifles on a long night march through very difficult mountain country. The Government-in Council appreciates very highly his quick decisions and splendid effort as well as the good work of the civil Officer with the column and of the men of the Assam rifles. If the dispositions made by these officers had not been as sound as the marching and the courage of the men were admirable, they could not have won the great success they did in such difficult and dangerous circumstances. The woman had acquired a great notoriety on account of her alleged supernatural powers and it was probably that her arrest would lead to resistance, but Captain Macdonald's excellent handling of the situation before and after the capture of the woman resulted in complete success without any resistance and consequent loss of life or injury to any one".

With him was associated Mr. Hari Blah, Extra Assistant Commissioner about whom Macdonald wrote:-

"28- Mr. Blah rendered the greatest assistance throughout the operation. In the confusion after entering the village he remained cool and by forcing our guides to hurry on was largely responsible for Gaidiliu's capture."

Gaidiliu was tried and convicted at Manipur on a charge of murder and sentenced to transportation for life.

The arrest and conviction of Gaidiliu did not end the matter. According to letter No. Pol. 1850-6261-A.P., dated the 8th August 1835, to the Government of India, in which the Assam Government asked

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for the detention of 7 Nagas under Regulation 111 of 1918 it appeared that:-

"..... certain Kacha Naga of ~~the~~ the Naga Hills and ~~all~~ of the neighbouring villages in the Manipur State had obtained access to her (Gaidiliu) while in the Manipur State jail on more than one occasion by bribing the jail staff, and..... she had urged them to keep the movement alive. By way of following out her injunction to keep the movement alive the Kuki Chawkidar of the Lakema Inspection Bungalow in the Naga Hills district, who was supposed, quite incorrectly, to have been responsible for giving the information which had led to Gaidiliu's arrest, was marked down for murder. A party of Nagas principally from the

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\* Assam Secretariat, Confidential Political, A, September 1936.

Nos. 1-63.

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villages of Leng in Manipur and Bopungwemi in the Naga Hills, but also containing a number of individuals from other villages concerned in the movement, made a raid by night upon this rather isolated bungalow, and finding the Chawkidar himself absent massacred his wife and family (four or five children) and two Kukis strangers, who stopped there for the night. The raiding party got back to Bopungwemi either in the dark of by jungle paths away from the main road on the following day, and apparently was never seen by anyone between the time it left and returned to Bopungwemi village.

This raid took place in December 1932 and during the same month reports were received from more than one quarter of dances and semi-religious celebrations held in disaffected Kacha Naga villages and of the great nervousness on the part of the Kukis who live mostly in small hamlets scattered about among the much larger Naga villages and were, as they have been ever since, <sup>in</sup> a state of great apprehension as to what might not happen to them at any time; for although the Kukis in the Naga Hills all remained loyal, with the

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exception of one individual, through out the operations of 1917 to 1919, they share with the rebel Kukis of the Manipur State the hatred which the Kacha Naga now feels for all Kukis on account of certain sufferings at their hands experience during the rebellion in Manipur State.

This tension on the part of the Kukis was accentuated by the discovery in March 1933 of a headless corpse of Maku which was rumoured at the time to be a Kuki though it proved in fact to have been that of a Manipuri. The head had been carried away by the Kacha Nagas who had committed the murder and offered to the python god at Leng. In the following May this same village of Leng. Which was the centre of the movement on the Manipur side as Bopungwemi has been on the Naga Hills side, sent out a deputation urging villages in the Kacha Naga country not to pay any tax, a movement which was accompanied by dances of a ceremonial nature in many villages although it was not the correct season for such dances at all. In June information was obtained that this propaganda was also directed to the abandonment of cultivation partly on the ground that the god would provide food, and partly on the ground that Government was about to collapse and by the autumn villages would be at war. This rumour of the approaching collapse of Government was accompanied by one that a king called Gandhi, who was described as a son of the Jadonag who had been executed in 1931. The result of this movement has been to make the collection of house tax extremely difficult in many villages, although the Kacha Naga is actually probably no worse off than the Kuki, who pays under similar conditions; but it has also accentuated the poverty arising from economic causes that have been out that a great deal of the success of this movement has been and is still is economic in origin. Many Kacha Nagas have nothing whatever to lose and are therefore easily seduced by any prospect

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.....In May, 1934 another prophet was arrested in Ncharramai by the Assam Rifles guard at Henima. He had been touring the disaffected villages in Manipur, the North Cachar Hills and the Naga Hills, claiming as usual divine or magical powers to cure illnesses, and holding ceremonies to commemorate Gaidiliu and Jaddanang., and confirming his following in their refusal to pay taxes. The Indian Officer, who happened to be a Juki, got information of his activities and made a clever arrest. This man Haido, of Pabakan Youte in Manipur, ultimately made a confession and has turned an approver in the case against Ramjo and others of Bopungwemi for the outrage at Lakema.

As a result of information received from him, and conforming previous information obtained from Leng and elsewhere, one Ramjo of Bopungwemi was arrested. This was in July 1934. It has been satisfactorily substantiated that Ramjo was the principle leader of the Bopungwemi party in the butchery at Lakema bungalow----- the Government of Assam is satisfied that it is really dangerous to release him, but so far it has been impossible to get sufficient evidence to come into Court to convict him of crimes..... He is the first of the men whom this Government now proposes should be dealt with under Regulation 111 of 1918.

After the arrest of Ramjo there was for a time quiescence in the Kacha Naga country and the Deputy Commissioner toured the greater part of it without an escort, and was everywhere received in a friendly manner, but it was clear that in Bopungwemi and in one or two other villages the movement continued below the surface. In November ~~1934~~ of the same year another of the murderers, one Dikeo of Bopungwemi, was arrested, but managed to escape by night in his handcuffs from the fort at Henima. He has since evaded arrest but is known to moving about among the disaffected villages in the Naga Hills and Manipur, and more particularly in the less closely administered areas in the North Cachar Hills, preaching disaffection and hiding from justice."

In addition to these two men, the Assam Government wished to place under restraint 5 others, viz., vomhel of Bopungwemi and a girl Arelu, associated with him, and 8 men Italakpe of Laloi.

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Italakpe of Tnsung and Ivongtieng of Be-enmi.

The Government of India agreed in their letter No. F.425-P/ 35, dated the 31st January 1936. As it turned out, Gomhei and A-eliu had by now been convicted, in September 1935, and sentenced to terms of imprisonment, while Italakpe of Laloi had died.

Of the remaining 4, the histories of the other Italakpe, Ivongteing and of Pamjo need not be pursued. Dikeo remained absconding until November 1st 1940, when he was shot by the Assam Rifles guard at Henima while attempting to escape from a house which they had surrounded.

Between 1935 when the letter above referred to was written and 1941 the agitation never entirely died down and there were periodical rumours of fresh attempts to revive the Gaidiliu cult

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\*Assam Secretariat, Confidential, Political, A, September 1936, Nos. 1.68.

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but the movement fortunately never reached the scale it did in Jadonang's day. It remained necessary, however, to maintain the outpost at Henima in the Kacha Naga country as a precaution and as a base for the hunt for Dekio.

VII. Pangsha and other Expeditions, 1936-39.- In April 1936 Mr. Mills, Deputy Commissioner, submitted a report on the behaviour of Pangsha, a Kalo Kenyo village in Tribal territory outside the Control Area. They had been responsible for 200 deaths in the last 6 months: they had raided Kejuk within the Control Area and taken 53 heads: They had raided Saochu, also within the Control Area and taken 138 heads: and they had been selling captured as slaves. Though Pangsh was outside the Control Area, their conduct had been such that Mr. Mills advised that an expedition be sent against them.

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The then Governor of Assam, Sir Michael Keane, approved of the proposal, and placed it before the Government of India in Government letter No. Pol.- 1948/7374-A.P., dated the 21st August 1936. In a previous letter written in May 1936 he had already mentioned Pangsha in connection with the subject of slavery and had expressed the view that the best way of dealing with the problem was to extend the control Area so as to cover slave-keeping villages.

The Government of India's approval to a visit to Pangsha having been accorded, the operations took place between November 13th and December 13th, 1936, with Mr. Mills in political charge, Major W.L. W.R.B. Williams, 7th Gurkhas Commandant, in command of the escort of 2½ platoons of the 3rd Assam Rifles, and Mr. G.W.J. Smith, I.P., in charge of the 360 carriers, while Dr. Von Furber Haimendorf, an Austrian scientist also had permission to accompany the expedition (it is described in his book "The Naked Nagas") The course of the expeditions is described in the following extract from the Deputy Commissioner's Report No. 3814-G., dated the 20th December 1936.-

"..... On November 20th we reached our advanced base at Chingmei where the loyalty of my old friend Chingmak was of inestimable value, There we found that Pangsha had handed over to him all their slaves but one; they still defied us to visit them, and I found they had terrorised the whole neighbourhood, threatening to destroy any village which helped us.

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Soon after passing the Noklak-Pangsh boundary we saw a small unnamed party of Pangsha men in the distance. Four were induced to come and speak to us, and brought with them a goat and a chicken. They asked whether we would make peace. There was not the slightest doubt as to the only possible answer. To have made peace turned back and abandoned the remaining slave at the price of a goat, a fowl and some smooth words would inevitably have been interpreted as a sign of weakness.

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Friends who had helped us would have been massacred and raids would have continued. I therefore told the envoys that I did not believe their statement that they could not produce the slave girl, and that I was going to punish them for their conduct and insults to Government.

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On November 26th we burnt the main village, nearly losing four coolies who straggled against orders. In the afternoon we moved down stream to below the separate Wensoi 'khel'. Next morning the baggage with one platoon was sent straight to Noklak, and one platoon with a few scouts and debashis went up to burn the 'khel'. We were very heavily attacked on our way down in a last effort by Pangsha to wipe us out. It was only the skill and coolness of Major Williams and his force that enabled us to make a safe withdrawal to Noklak, without losing a man and after inflicting losses on the enemy, whom ground and cover enabled to charge to within 50 yards before they were stopped.

That evening Chingmei and Noklak made peace, Noklak being no longer in any doubt as to the safer side of the fence. It also fined Noklak for their previous hostility. Ponyo, who may have sent a contingent to help Pangsha, also came to see me. I sent word through them to Pangsha that if they would come and talk to me at Chingmei their envoys would be safe. This they did two days later, bringing with them the leading ~~and~~ ~~men~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Burma~~ ~~villages~~ ~~Ponyo~~ ~~and~~ ~~Shiwu~~. They admitted and promised to stop slave-raiding and to return the remaining slave. All three villages were on a path of friendship and were sent home with presents of salt. Pangsha kept their word and the slave girl was sent for from her purchasers in Burma and brought to our camp at Chentang on December 7th and is now safe with her parents."

The Government of Assam in forwarding Mr. Mills' report on the 30th January 1937 to the Government of India commented as follows:-

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"2. The expedition completely achieved its objects in effecting the release of several slaves taken as captives and in inflicting on Pangsha a well merited punishment not only for its participation in the slave trade but for its head-hunting raids on its neighbours. The Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, has been asked to submit proposals for the constitution of a Control Area to include Pangsha and other villages".

The slavery aspect of these operations was referred to by the Government of India when issuing the report for general information in the following terms:-

India is a party to the Slavery Convention, 1926, and has undertaken to bring about progressively and as soon as possible the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms. It was however found necessary to make a reservation in respect of certain outlying and inaccessible areas bordering on Assam and Burma where, it was thought, it would be difficult to implement our undertaking effectively. Recently the Government of India have agreed to the reservation being withdrawn in respect of certain cases including the Naga Hills area in Assam. As a first step towards the fulfilment of the requirement under the Slave

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Convention to bring about the abolition of slavery in this area, the Government of India, at the request of the Government of Assam, agreed to an expedition, headed by the Deputy Commissioner Naga Hills, and composed of a column of Assam rifles. The object of the expedition was to acquaint the headmen of the villages with the determination of Government to suppress the practice of slavery and, if they persisted in an attitude of defiance, to punish them. This action was rendered imperative by the conduct of one of the villages in that area, namely, Pangsha, which, with the assistance of certain other neighbouring and holding their captives as slaves in defiance of warning Government".

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The proposals\* referred to in paragraph 2 of the Assam letter dated 30th January 1937 were duly submitted, and with the sanction of the Government of India, the control Area was extended so as to include Paggsha, Sanglao, Noklak and certain other Kalo Kanguyu villages with effect from January 1938. In forwarding his proposals the Deputy Commissioner said that "The proposed extension of the Control Area covers the approaches to the only known pass into ~~xxxx~~ Burma through which slaves are taken, and the whole of the country in which we know that slave-raiding has survived to the present."

In November 1937 Mr. Pawsey, Deputy Commissioner, accompanied by Mr. Hari Blah, Sub-Divisional Officer, Mokokchung, Major B.C. He Genty and 174 officers and men of the 3rd Assam Rifles conducted a successful expedition of Nokhu for the purpose of releasing slaves in the following circumstances:-

After the 1936 expedition to Paggsha, it transpired that the village of Sanglao still held one slave and in spite of constant warnings refused to release the slave. The Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, accordingly asked for permission to warn Sanglao that unless the slaves were released the village would be visited and punished. Government permission was accorded to this action. It subsequently transpired that the village of Nokhu had not released their slaves in spite of their affirmations to the Deputy Commissioner last year, and that the village of Pesu, south-west of Sanglao, the position of which was then unknown, held at least one slave. It was not ~~xxxx~~ known whether villages further south held slaves or not. The sanction to the expedition was duly obtained from the Government of India. Throughout the rainy season constant attempts were made to get the villages to release their slaves, but although it was reported that Sanglao had obeyed ~~Government~~ orders, Nokhu and Pesu remained obstinate."

The Expedition left Mokokchung on the 1st November 1937 and by the end of the month all the slaves known to be in the unadministered area were set free without any casualty on our side. Nokhu was reached on November 12th, 4 slaves were released and a fine

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was exacted: Sanglao was reached on the 15th and was

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\* ~~Governor's~~ \*Governor's Secretariat, Tribal, A, September 1938,  
Nos. 1-27.

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"Overwhelmingly friendly" : Pesu was reached on the 17th and burnt and slaves recovered. Soon after the expedition was over reports were received that, while Pesu was being rebuilt after it was burnt during the expedition, Panso went and took 6 heads from them.

In 1939\* Pangsha and some of its neighbours had again to be visited and punished. Early in 1939 Yungkao, Tamkhung and Ukha and took 12 heads off Agching, and in June of that year Panghs, Ukha and Yungkao destroyed agching, taking 96 heads. Guns were provided for the endangered village for their protection and the sending of a column was agreed to. Mr. Pawsey, Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, was in charge and was accompanied by Major A. R. Nye, M.C.; and 3 platoons of the Assam Rifles, and Mr. F.P. Adams, I.C.S., Sub-Divisional Officer, Mokokchung. There was no opposition. Pangsha was burnt and property destroyed : Yngkao, which submitted unconditionally, was ~~not destroyed~~ fined only : Tamkhung was fine a small sum : Ukha was burnt. Unfortunately Mongu and Mongsen, the Pangsha leaders, were not arrested. Pangsha and Yungkao were told not to raid the small villages in the Control Area on our side of the river. Ukha were told through an intermediary, but not directly as they did not come in, that guns must not be used in the Control Area.

VIII. The Constitution Act of 1935.- Throughout the discussions previous to the framing of the new Act, the authorities concerned had no difficulty in agreeing that the Naga Hills ought to be kept outside the purview of the New Constitution. They were accordingly declared to be as 'Excluded Area' under the Government of India (Excluded and partially Excluded areas) Order, 1936 and have since the 1st of April 1937 been administered by the Governor in his discretion.

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Governor's Secretariat, December 1939, Nos. 1-113.  
\*Governor's Secretariat, Tribal, A, June 1941, Nos. 1-125.